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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines science fiction dystopias in which the vestiges of humanist
philosophy taint the construction of posthuman subjects. With a grounding in the tenets
of both humanist and posthumanist philosophy, I analyze eight works of science fiction
that depict artificial intelligence, cyborgs, and body swapping to determine the common
critiques made. The source of the troubling aspects of these imagined futures doesn’t
derive strictly from the presence of advanced, posthumanist technologies. Instead, the
authors shine a light on the monstrosity that results when technological posthumanism
comes to fruition while their imagined future societies remain grounded in humanist
hierarchies, including that of class, gender, and race.
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Introduction: The Posthuman Subject in Science Fiction
The imagery of the “posthuman” evokes a wide range of connotations. Does it
look like a person with silicone skin and aluminum bones? Is it the creature that results
from thousands of years of human evolution, adapted to survive an unfamiliar
environment? Is it a version of a consciousness experiencing life within a computer
simulation? Posthumanism, in short, is all of the above and more. It is a philosophy,
theoretical approach, and ideology that decenters the human subject. In fiction, it
typically manifests itself through the depiction of posthuman beings that exceed the
known bounds of the human body, like cyborgs or genetic hybrids. But posthumanism is
also a critical theory that destabilizes humanism, which firmly centers the subjectivity of
man above all else. Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” (1985) was a pioneering
work in the field of posthumanism. Haraway envisions a future in which the fusion of
animal and machine renders obsolete the oppositions between natural and unnatural,
individual and the collective. Haraway writes, “A cyborg world might be about lived
social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with
animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory
standpoints” (229). Technology, to Haraway, presents a unique opportunity to create a
greater society in which binaries and the hierarchies they engender no longer exist.
Despite being a relatively new term, the creation of posthuman beings and the
possibilities of a posthuman future have been an interest of humanity since ancient times.
Hephaestus, the Greek god of blacksmithing, was said to have created Talos, a giant
bronze man tasked with protecting Crete from invaders (Shashkevich). Hephaestus also
built Pandora, who Hesiod’s Theogony describes as a woman sent to Earth to punish
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humans for discovering fire. In this version of the story, Adrienne Mayor likens Pandora
to what a modern science fiction reader might call an “evil fembot” (Mayor,
“Introduction” 1). Hindu and Buddhist texts from the end of the first millennium describe
robot warriors guarding Buddha’s relics (Mayor, “Robots”). And the clay-based Golem
of 16th-century Jewish folklore is yet another example of an artificial human.
The posthuman beings of myth and folklore were generally created for the
purpose of labor, which continued to be the case as modern science fiction grew in
popularity. In fact, the term “robot,” which first appeared in Karel Čapek’s 1920 play
R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), derives from the Old Church Slavonic word rabota,
which means servitude or forced labor (Markel). In the play, the robots are mass
produced by a corporation to perform work that is undesirable to humans. The robots
ultimately revolt, killing all but one human before realizing that they are unable to
manufacture more robots. Instead of falling into destruction, however, two robots fall in
love with one another, ending the play as the modern Adam and Eve. This foundational
robot-based text is an illustration of how labor struggles and civil rights are central to the
history of the robot in fiction.
The posthuman subject regularly features as an antagonist or monstrosity in
science fiction, typically to symbolize human short-sightedness in the creation of new
technology. Some of these figures are driven to homicidal fury because of their
enslavement, much like Čapek’s pioneering framework. This can be seen in the replicants
in the film Blade Runner, who are enslaved androids that murder their masters and plot to
manipulate the man that manufactured them. The bodiless artificial intelligence HAL
9000 from Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 film 2001: A Space Odyssey is an example of the
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fallibility of programming; HAL is primarily programmed to see the mission through
(and keep it concealed from the crew) no matter what, but he is simultaneously forbidden
from withholding essential information from the crew. It seems that every expectation
and possibility was considered when programming this ultra-intelligent AI except for the
moral complexity of what HAL is expected to do. On the other hand, the Skynet
supercomputer of The Terminator initiates nuclear war and creates robots to kill the
remaining humans on earth, a far larger project than HAL’s localized murders. The
similarly sadistic supercomputer AM in Harlan Ellison’s 1967 short story “I Have No
Mouth, and I Must Scream” loathes mankind enough to not simply annihilate all humans,
but to keep 5 in captivity to torture indefinitely. The hubris of the Icarus narrative, in
which human ambition leads to their own demise, has consistently served as an intriguing
plot element beyond science fiction. But in many cases, the reasoning for the AI’s hatred
for the human being goes without much explanation or consideration. It’s implied that
this animosity derives from the embodiment or logic of the AI being incompatible with
that of humans. The technology is the core of the conflict.
In contrast, some works of science fiction that feature a posthuman subject offer a
positive, or at least whimsical, depiction of artificial humans or cyborgs as a celebration
of an increasingly technological future. For example, in the television show The Six
Million Dollar Man (1973-1978), Steve Austin, a critically injured NASA astronaut, is
rebuilt with bionic limbs and an eye implant, making him the optimal secret agent. The
iconic opening sequence depicts Steve being fitted with bionic parts, with a narrating
voice saying that Steve will be “Better than he was before. Better, stronger, faster”
(Irving 1:02-1:11). Steve’s transformation into a cyborg is seen as a lifesaving tool that
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not only keeps him alive, but improves his physical abilities going forward. In another
case, Star Trek: The Next Generation features a crew member named Data, who is a
sentient android. His consciousness and autonomy are brought into question in one
episode, but he is fervently defended by his human captain and ultimately determined to
be a person. Star Trek’s Federation is largely considered to be a representation of a
utopian society, so it’s reasonable that Data wouldn’t face the discrimination that
androids do in other works of science fiction.
Despite these occasionally positive portrayals, the cyborgs present in much of
science fiction don’t often align with Haraway’s utopian vision. If the posthuman subject
isn’t a direct threat to the existence of the human race (i.e., Skynet), it is perceived as an
inferior servant, which reinforces the anthropocentric hierarchies constructed by humanist
thought (i.e. replicants in Blade Runner). The most compelling posthuman subjects, to
me, are those that are more nuanced than the friendly android or evil supercomputer.
Lending an inner life, subjectivity, and sympathetic characteristics to morally complex
posthuman characters necessitates reflection in a way that the dichotomy of good and evil
can’t offer. Technology, on its own, is strictly neutral. It is the intentions and biases of
creators, distributors, and users that determine whether it is friend or foe. This thesis
examines science fiction with sympathetic posthuman subjects—androids, cyborgs, and
people swapping bodies with others—in future worlds that haven’t moved past
humanism. These texts beg more pressing questions than the assertion that technology is
bad; instead, they explore how it can be abused in unethical ways or how it exacerbates
existing inequalities of humanism. The trajectory of our society doesn’t suggest that
technology will become a shrinking aspect of our daily lives. These narratives explore the
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infinite range of possibilities for future technologies and what can result if we fail to
adapt the dominant mindset of our species to one that is more compatible with a
posthuman future.
I. Humanism
Posthumanism, a movement that seeks to move past the concept of the human, is
defined against the slippery term humanism. At its simplest definition, humanism is a
philosophy that privileges human intellect, subjectivity, and interests over all else. But as
James L. Battersby writes, “Just as there is no such thing as history, only histories, so
there is no humanism, only humanisms, a confusing, often contradictory, array of
humanisms” (555-6). Humanism has existed for centuries and has taken many forms, so I
will try to distill the core tenets of the philosophy as they appear throughout history.
The term humanism is used retroactively to refer to a group of scholars during the
Renaissance, although they did not refer to themselves in this way. The commonality
between all Renaissance humanists, according to Corliss Lamont, was an interest in
Greek and Latin classics, an investment in secularizing the recording of history, and the
belief that a robust education results in a better society (20). Perez Zagorin writes in his
overview of humanism over time that Renaissance humanism’s goal was to create a class
of men that were “classically educated, morally sound, accomplished in the arts of
speaking and writing, competent to advise and serve in the governments of kings, prices,
and cities” (Zagorin 88). Given that in medieval times, art was created for strictly
religious purposes, the worldly and secular subjects that the Renaissance humanists were
concerned with gained the scorn of the Vatican, despite many of these scholars being
Christian. For instance, one of many important figures of Renaissance humanism was
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Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), who expressed in his Oration on the Dignity
of Man that there were limitless possibilities to what man could accomplish through selfactualization. Pico wrote:
Man is the most fortunate of living things, and, consequently, deserving of all
admiration; of what may be the condition in the hierarchy of beings assigned to
him, which draws upon him the envy, not of the brutes alone, but of the astral
beings and of the very intelligences which dwell beyond the confines of the
world. (4)
This speech, widely referred to as the “Manifesto of the Renaissance,” encapsulates the
anthropocentrism that resides at the heart of Renaissance humanism and would come to
define future iterations of the movement as well. It is also clear through his reference to
“astral beings” that Renaissance humanists were far from atheistic.
Pico’s oration defines the importance of hierarchy in humanism, a tradition that
reaches into ancient times. Protagoras, a fifth century BCE Greek philosopher, stated,
“Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are
not that they are not” (qtd in Lamont 31). The human has long served as a point of
comparison, particularly with other creatures. This carries into the third century BCE,
when Aristotle devised an animal classification scheme that would come to be known as
scala naturae, which hierarchized humans over all other living animals (Granger 186).
The scala naturae went on to be infused with Christian theology in the medieval Great
Chain of Being, which put only God and angels above the esteemed position of the
human. Hierarchizing the human above other living things justifies the interest in human
rationality and exceptionalism that is central to humanist philosophy.
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18th and 19th century Enlightenment humanists, who retroactively granted the
Renaissance humanists their title, have both distinct similarities to and vast differences
from their Renaissance predecessors. Although both Renaissance and Enlightenment
humanists see humans as superior to all other living creatures, John Luik writes that, for
Enlightenment humanists, “human dignity was not a function of man’s allegedly divine
origin, but of the ordering and rational possibilities of earthly existence” (Luik). To
Enlightenment humanists, human subjectivity is the definitive authority on truth and
rationality. Philosophers like David Hume used this notion to promote empiricism, which
is the theory that all knowledge derives from experience. Another distinction between
these two movements are their perspectives on the sciences. Corliss Lamont notes that
“many of the Renaissance Humanists displayed a profound and active disdain for natural
science,” which set a foundation for the division of the humanities and sciences in
academia in the coming centuries (20). But when a wave of scientific progress defined
the Enlightenment period, humanists largely embraced it as a more rational explanation
of worldly events than religion could offer. This agnosticism is reminiscent of the most
familiar context in which humanism is seen today: secular humanism, which is intended
to be an alternative to religion that affirms a sense of morality and duty that atheism is
assumed to lack.
Another influential idea that arose from Enlightenment humanism is that of liberal
humanism, which is foundational to the political and economic systems that exist today.
Liberal humanism, like all other strains of humanism, is difficult to define precisely, but
M.A.R. Habib writes that, “liberal humanism has comprised the mainstream philosophies
of the bourgeois Enlightenment, such as rationalism, empiricism and utilitarianism”
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(Habib, “Epilogue”). It encapsulates the laissez-faire market capitalism developed by
economists like Adam Smith as well as John Locke’s vision of democracy and individual
rights. This also includes an imperial impulse, according to Habib, who writes that liberal
humanism seeks “not only to conquer other parts of the world for their economic
resources but to submit them also to the civilizing effects of Western literature and
culture,” which is an extension of the core beliefs about an educated populous that
derives from Renaissance humanism (Habib “Epilogue”). Above all, the liberal humanist
subject is an individual whose essence is not reliant on environmental influences. In the
words of C.B. Macpherson, "Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the
individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to
society for them … The human essence is freedom from the wills of others, and freedom
is a function of possession” (qtd. in Hayles 3). The individual, in this sense, is defined by
the mind far more than the body or surrounding environment.
The 20th century saw scientific and philosophical developments that threatened
the exceptionalism of the human. Zagorin writes that during this century, “the concept of
man ceased to be dominated by humanistic assumptions, so man now not only stood apart
from God, but also, with the ascendency of the naturalistic perspective, ceased to be seen
as a special being” (89). Zagorin notes that the devastation and depravity that took place
in both World Wars shook the belief in the fundamental “dignity and nobility” of man
(89). The perception of evolution as progressive, which reinforces the idea that the
human is the most advanced living creature (i.e., the March of Progress illustration
depicting an ape slowly morphing into the perfected human) was criticized as
“scientifically undefensible (sic)” (Rigato and Minelli). Psychoanalysts like Sigmund
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Freud posited that human personality was constructed not by conscious self-actualization
but by the drives and irrationalities of the unconscious mind. As such, Michel Foucault
famously declared “the death of man” in the 1966 book The Order of Things (373).
Foucault writes, “It is no longer possible to think in our day other than in the void left by
man’s disappearance. For this void does not create a deficiency … It is nothing more, and
nothing less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think”
(373). Of course, Foucault is not referring to the literal death of humankind, instead
declaring that the widely accepted conception that the human has of itself is collapsing.
The increasing pressure on the humanist conception of the human lays the groundwork
for posthumanism as an alternative philosophy to that of humanism.
II. Posthumanism
Ihab Hassan’s “Prometheus as Performer,” published in 1977, is an essay in the
form of a play, in which various aspects of the text engage in dialogue regarding the
waning of humanism as predicted by psychoanalysts like Freud and Lacan, as identified
by Foucault and Levi-Strauss, and as intensified by the rise of the machine. Hassan
writes, “We need to understand that five hundred years of humanism may be coming to
an end, as humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call
posthumanism” (843). To some extent, posthumanism remains a slippery term that is
invoked to describe a wide range of philosophies. Hassan determines the lowest common
denominator of all iterations of posthumanism—the goal to move beyond the tenets of
humanism.
Posthumanism, for instance, is a rejection of the anthropocentrism at the heart of
humanism. In How We Became Posthuman, N. Katherine Hayles writes that “the
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posthuman view considers consciousness … as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary
upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor
sideshow” (2-3). The posthumanist view sees human consciousness as an incident of
evolution, just like the wide variety of remarkable traits (notably, ones that humans lack)
seen in nonhuman animals. The essential differences that the humanist invokes to divide
humanity from the animal or the machine are seen by the posthumanist as largely
inconsequential, presumptuous, or fully false.
Through this blurring of difference, posthumanism also dismantles the hierarchies
that organize the humanist view of the self and the natural world. Kate Manne writes in
her critique of humanism that a humanist perspective fails to recognize divergent kinds of
humans as categorically the same as the self. Manne writes that the Other can be viewed
as “subhuman creatures, nonhuman animals, supernatural beings (e.g., demons, witches),
or even as mere things (i.e., mindless beings)” (390). She specifically references Elliot
Rodger, who conducted a series of fatal attacks in 2014 to broadly punish women for
rejecting him and exact revenge on sexually active men for claiming the women he felt
entitled to. In his manifesto, he doesn’t strip women of their autonomy because, to him,
they use their autonomy against him. Incels, or involuntary celibates, a group that has
since made Rodger into a martyr, refer to women as “femoids,” which is a portmanteau
of female and android. It’s easy to see how the labeling of groups as a monstrous chimera
of human and inhuman is directly connected to the labeling of groups as a posthuman
threat. A woman, to the incel, is unfeeling and motivated by the hormones and drives that
“program” her, and that can be weaponized to justify violence. If there wasn’t a
hierarchical divide between the human and nonhuman, this comparison couldn’t happen.
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These hierarchies are key justifications for imperialism, another ideology that is
historically associated with humanist tendencies. Andrew Zimmerman applies this notion
in terms of European imperialism, writing, “The paradox of non-Europeans for the
European human sciences … was that they were human yet could not be acknowledged
as possessing full ‘humanity.’ Humanist notions of the self were both defined and
profoundly threatened by the existence of humans whom Europeans regarded as inferior”
(xiii). The belief that this supposedly inferior Other defines the European self can be seen
in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, in which the recognition and domination of the
enslaved Other is used to construct the identity of the master. Habib claims that Hegel is
“the philosopher of liberal humanism,” and his dialectics exposed the corruptions and
contradictions at the heart of capitalist society and its imperial drive (“Introduction” 5).
In terms of how posthumanism defines itself in comparison to humanism, the
most important distinction lies in the posthumanist rejection of the liberal humanist
subject through the concept of the feedback loop, which inextricably ties the human
subject to its environment. The Macy Conferences on Cybernetics, held between 1946
and 1953, were instrumental in developing the language and concepts used to understand
how the minds of humans, animals, and, indeed, computers function in similar ways.
Feedback loops are, in essence, the technological parallel to homeostasis in organic
creatures. Both describe the phenomenon by which an individual seeks to maintain
stability in response to a changing environment. A human, for instance, involuntarily
shivers in response to a cold environment. In a similar sense, feedback loops have been
an integral part of technological advancement since the centrifugal governors that
regulated the flow of fuel in steam engines, whose legacy lives on in the tiny
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microcontrollers that regulate the modern internal combustion engine. Explaining how
this concept dismantles the liberal humanist subject, N. Katherine Hayles writes that “the
idea of the feedback loop implies that the boundaries of the autonomous subject are up
for grabs, since feedback loops can flow not only within the subject but between the
subject and the environment” (2). The liberal humanist subject, considered to owe
nothing to its society or environment, is a myth, as it is inextricably tied to its
environment and other subjects.
Because posthumanist philosophy views a human subject as being enmeshed with
its environment, it shares many core tenets with critical animal studies, which seeks to
dismantle the systems of oppression that impact non-human animals. Jacques Derrida’s
The Animal That Therefore I Am sought to deconstruct the boundary between human and
animal as well as the extensive scholarly tradition that reinforced and even celebrated this
boundary. Derrida accuses Aristotle and the “Greco-Judeo-Christiano-Islamic tradition,”
including Adam’s naming of Earth’s animals in Genesis, of setting the foundation for this
seemingly common-sense differentiation of humans from the rest of the animals that exist
(55). The experience at the center of Derrida’s lecture was the embarrassment and
vulnerability that resulted from being observed by a cat in the nude, which suggested to
him that the cat possessed subjectivity. Derrida writes that the discourses of philosophers
like Descartes and Kant are “sound and profound, but everything in them goes on as if
they themselves had never been looked at, and especially not naked, by an animal that
addressed them” (14). Although the cat did not use language to address Derrida, he
regards the cat’s subjectivity as valid nonetheless. Similarly, Jeremy Bentham, a 17th18th century utilitarianist philosopher and early animal rights advocate, wrote that speech
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or reason cannot be used to privilege the human over the animal because “a full-grown
horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal,
than an infant” (311). Indeed, there are plenty of people who are undeniably human that
do not fit the various criteria presented by the humanist. Instead, Bentham says that the
question should not be if the animal can talk, but if it can suffer (311). Derrida writes that
this question reframes the comparison of the human and animal from faculty to passivity,
“a not-being-able” (27). The definition of a valuable living creature, to Bentham, should
not be whether it is able to talk or reason, but whether it is not able to withstand agony. It
is a blatant reminder of the mutual helplessness in the face of death that the human shares
with the non-human, a notion that, Cary Wolfe writes, “it has been the business of
humanism largely to disavow” (“Human” 570).
Wolfe argues that any attempt of a marginalized group to shift upward in the
hierarchy within the human race ultimately reinforces the notions of liberal humanism
that create those hierarchies in the first place. He uses a collection of papers published
from a conference on disability to demonstrate this. In these papers, the authors use
specific examples as to why those with disabilities are deserving of equality, which
includes their transition from being the objects in experimental studies to the subjects
doing the observing and studying. They use the liberal humanist subject as the prototype
of a person that deserves rights and liberties, and specifically highlight the attributes that
a historically marginalized person has that mimic that of the liberal humanist subject.
Wolfe writes that activism that works within a liberal humanist framework “allow[s] one
to achieve certain pragmatic gains in the short run, but at the price of a radical
foreshortening of a more ambitious and more profound ethical project: a new and more
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inclusive form of ethical pluralism that is our charge, now, to frame” (137). Wolfe’s
profound ethical project seems to be the foundations of Haraway’s cyborgian utopia, in
which politics are comprised of “transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous
possibilities” (228). In a cyborg world, this multiplicity of embodied experience could be
reinterpreted as a lateral type of diversity, rather than a ranked classification, forging a
more equitable world for the humans who currently inhabit it and the posthuman subjects
to come.
III. The Mind–Body Problem
One possible way to forge a more hospitable society for all people is to embrace
the diversity of bodies as a strength rather than a weakness. This, however, requires one
to consider the body as an essential part of forming one’s own subjectivity. On the
contrary, Descartes, the 17th century philosopher who famously determined “I think,
therefore I am,” pioneered the belief that the human mind and body are ontologically
distinct. In fact, he posed that the universe was solely composed of those two substances,
the mind as a thinking, unextended substance and the body (or physical matter) as
unthinking, extended substance (Dicker 86). This generated what is referred to as the
mind–body problem, which asks how two ontologically different substances are able to
sustain a causal relationship. Descartes himself offered weak explanations, but many
have contributed their input over the centuries.
The debate regarding the connection between the mind and the body poses
conflict within humanism and posthumanism alike. Mind–body dualism reinforces the
humanist belief in the exceptionalism and rationality of the human mind, as Descartes
claimed that the mind (a trait that he doesn’t grant to non-human animals) was the only
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“thinking” substance in the universe. Descartes’ conception of mind–body dualism is
often attributed to humanist philosophy on the grounds of privileging the human mind
over the body that contains it (Bartosch 148). Derrida writes that to Descartes, the
animal-machine is “deprived of a ‘me’ or ‘self,’ and even more of any capacity for
reflection, indeed of any mark or autobiographical impression of its own life” (76). By
arguing against an animal subjectivity, Descartes posits that the human mind is
extraordinarily exceptional in that it is unlike every other substance that exists in the
universe.
In posthumanism, mind–body dualism is sometimes affirmed through the notion
that consciousness is simply informational patterns, which are independent from physical
substrates. Influential roboticist Hans Moravec, for instance, imagines a reality in which a
human consciousness could be uploaded to a computer unchanged. He claims that
identity and consciousness are strictly composed of patterns within the brain, like binary
code. Although posthumanists can argue that the information that constructs the mind can
be disembodied, some argue that embodiment also plays a crucial role in the construction
of that information. Hayles asserts that although posthumanism privileges informational
patterns over materialism, reinforcing mind–body dualism is far from the “most
compelling” posthumanist perspective (246). Wolfe takes a stronger stance against this
notion, reading Moravec’s transhumanist fantasy of the transcendent consciousness and
perfectibility of human form as “an intensification of humanism” (xv). Wolfe goes to
great lengths to distinguish his critical posthumanist work from that of transhumanists
(xx). Critical posthumanists generally oppose the notion of mind–body dualism, insisting
that the mind and the body fundamentally construct one another, or even that they are one
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and the same. In his exploration of posthumanism in reading practice, Roman Bartosch
writes that “recent work on finitude, and shared creatureliness has proved fruitful for
taking into account the commonalities between humans and animals” (146). If the mind
of an animal ceases to exist without the body and the functions of a computer aren’t
possible without the physical components that build it, then the same principles are true
of the human animal.
Secular humanists reject mind–body dualism for much the same reasons as do
critical posthumanists like Wolfe or Bartosch: the human is subject to natural forces as
much as any other living creature. In the 1990 book The Philosophy of Humanism,
Corliss Lamont lists central components of modern humanist philosophy, one of which is
that “man is an evolutionary product of the Nature of which he is part; that his mind is
indivisibly conjoined with the functioning of his brain; and that as an inseparable unity of
body and personality he can have no conscious survival after death” (13). The notion of
the human as a product of evolution bears great similarity to Hayles’ conception of the
consciousness as a “minor sideshow” in the history of human evolution (3). The loss of
religion in humanist philosophy, from the gentle secularism of Renaissance humanism to
the outright atheism of secular humanism, has forced the humanist to abandon mind–
body dualism in the 20th century and onward.
For the purposes of this thesis, I will follow in the tradition of primarily
attributing mind–body dualism to humanism, as it influenced a great deal of humanist
philosophy and, for centuries, provided reasoning for hierarchizing the human above
“lesser animals,” even if the secular humanists of modern day don’t literally believe that
the mind can subsist without the body (Bartosch 148). Although much of the
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posthumanist science fiction I will examine imagines the segregation of the
consciousness from the physical confines of the body (such as the body-swapping
narratives that will be analyzed in Chapter 3), these narratives tend to depict flaws in the
technology or the “memories” held within the body, even without a brain. In this sense,
the notion of embodiment constructing one’s subjectivity inextricably links the mind to
the body.
IV. Posthumanism and Humanism in Science Fiction
This thesis explores how the vestigial hierarchies of humanism hinder or taint the
construction of various posthuman subjects in science fiction. Haraway writes that “the
boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion” (226). It’s
certainly the case that many works of science fiction, particularly dystopian science
fiction, critique the lived realities of the present day. However, I think that it’s also
crucial to read these works of science fiction as they present themselves: as imagined
futures. Fiction writers do the work that scientists can’t. They envision and conjure the
infinite possibilities that can arise from even one small change to our social reality. In
these works, the troubling aspects of their societies don’t derive solely from the presence
of advanced, posthumanist technologies. Instead, the discontent arises from the
monstrosity that results when technological posthumanism comes to fruition while the
social reality remains grounded in humanist hierarchies. Technology is an exceedingly
efficient tool in reinforcing hierarchies and stratifying castes.
Throughout this thesis, I will be borrowing Zoltán Boldizsár Simon’s terms used
to distinguish between different forms of posthumanism in his essay “Two Cultures of
the Posthuman Future.” Critical posthumanism describes the “philosophical criticism of
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humanism and what is variously referred to as the figure of ‘Man,’ the Protagorean
measure of all things, the Cartesian subject, or the liberal subject of human mastery,
agency, and reason” (Simon 173). A critical posthumanist can possess a posthuman
viewpoint without having the inorganic components that define technological
posthumanism, which involves the fantastical, future technology you might associate with
the posthuman subject (Simon 178). These works of science fiction on which I will focus
posit possibilities of the inherently unknowable future of technological posthumanism.
Notably, though, these posthuman subjects are entrenched in a world still shaped by
humanist philosophy, not critical posthumanism. This is the root of the conflict in these
works of fiction.
The first chapter explores artificial intelligence in technological posthuman
subjects. In the androids of Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
(1968), the liminality expressed in both human and android identities serves to blur the
line between the human and inhuman. This indistinguishability between the human and
the nonhuman, the rejection of human exceptionalism, and the questioning of the
autonomy that the free market is supposed to provide are indicative that Dick is arguing
for critical posthumanism in his novel. He suggests that the authenticity of one’s
perceptions do not depend upon the authenticity of their origins. This novel is juxtaposed
with Larissa Lai’s short story “Rachel” (2004), which takes on the first-person
subjectivity of a prominent android in Dick’s text. However, Lai addresses the
intersections of race, gender, and posthumanity through the sympathetic rendering of
Rachel’s subjectivity.
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Shifting from completely artificial subjects to modified human ones, the second
chapter examines subjects fitted with prostheses—technological components that
supplement the organic body. Malka Older’s “The Black Box: These Memories are Made
to Last Forever” (2016) details how prosthetics can impact the perception of the self.
Older also posits that the perception that technology is infallible can end badly. These
subjects are commonly referred to as cyborgs. Carole McDonnell’s short story “Lingua
Franca” (2004) explores how prosthetics can be used to support colonization and erase
cultures, including the cultures formed within disabled communities. Finally, “Jon” by
George Saunders (2003) satirizes American consumerism and commercial culture
through the depiction of teenagers whose sole referents in language derive from a chip
containing thousands of advertisements that was implanted in their brains in infancy.
These texts examine the possibilities of how technology can be wielded to reinforce
capitalist interests and imperialist goals. It also addresses how technology, like any living
body, isn’t infallible.
The third chapter contains works that involve body swapping, a trope that is often
neglected in posthumanist scholarship on science fiction. In some ways, body-swapping
is a confirmation of mind–body dualism, as the mind is literally being segregated from
the body. Transhumanists largely embrace this idea, celebrating a future in which humans
can live within a computer with no perceptible changes. Many posthumanists, such as N.
Katherine Hayles and Cary Wolfe, argue to the contrary that embodiment plays a large
role in constructing the consciousness. The narratives examined in this chapter raise
important questions about how embodiment shapes the mind, despite their depiction of
what seems to be the clean separation of the mind and body. In Richard K. Morgan’s
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Altered Carbon (2002), consciousness is stored in a device at the base of the brain, which
can be removed and installed in any range of bodies. Calvin Gimpelevich’s short story
“Rent, Don’t Sell” (2017) depicts an amputee who makes a living by swapping into the
bodies of the rich and exercising so they don’t have to consciously. When a transgender
character regrets her decision to permanently swap bodies with someone else, the issue of
body ownership is raised. Finally, James Tiptree Jr’s short story “The Girl Who Was
Plugged in” (1973) is set in a future in which advertisements are illegal, which
corporations subvert by employing models to publicly tout their products. A socially
rejected teenager attempts suicide and is recruited by a company to remotely provide the
consciousness to a manufactured body. All of these narratives depict the ways in which
the body and the mind are intrinsically connected and the ways in which hierarchies that
are based in embodied traits persist, despite the lack of ownership the mind has over the
body in these settings.
None of these texts are depictions of the utopian future that Haraway envisioned,
despite the presence of incredible technologies and unique posthuman subjectivity.
However, the anthropocentrism and oppressive hierarchies that have emerged from
humanist philosophy reside in the center of this dystopia, an outdated model made for a
world that is long dead.
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Chapter 1: Artificial Intelligence
The imagery of a posthuman future often involves robots, cyborgs, and androids,
three related concepts with different definitions. A robot is any programmable machine,
from the iRobot Roombas that autonomously vacuum houses to the unmanned space
probes exploring our solar system and beyond. Within the realm of robots are androids,
which are robots that are specifically designed to look like humans. This term has been
used in a wider range of ways than that of “robot” or “cyborg,” but it generally denotes a
synthetically made human being composed of anything from dead flesh (Frankenstein’s
monster) to mechanical components (Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation).
Cyborgs, on the other hand, are organically born humans who are equipped with artificial
components or technology. In Star Wars, for example, R2-D2 is a robot, a programmed
machine with a non-human appearance and behaviors; C-3PO is an android, a
programmed machine with a humanoid appearance, voice, and anxieties; and Darth
Vader is a cyborg, an organically born human being whose limbs have been replaced
with mechanical parts.
Many fictional androids possess artificial intelligence (AI), a feature that has been
a source of anxiety for centuries. AI is a term that is colloquially used to describe a
machine that is capable of the vast range of abilities that the human brain has and beyond.
The possibility of AI in a future world has been prominent since the Industrial
Revolution. Samuel Butler, for instance, penned a letter to the editor of The Press
expressing his concerns about it in 1863. In “Darwin Among the Machines,” Butler uses
the newly published theory of evolution to consider the accelerated rate of technological
evolution. Vast technological change was apparent in the span of a single human lifetime,
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unlike the imperceptible shifts in animal and plant populations. He writes that “we are
ourselves creating our own successors” and that humans will become a slave race when
technology is able to surpass us (Butler 182). He warned that humans would become the
inferior species if we fail to destroy “every machine of every sort” (Butler 185). It’s
uncanny, really, how familiar this argument is to this day. It’s similar to the Singularity, a
concept popularized by Vernor Vinge in 1993. The Singularity is the point at which
technology with greater-than-human intelligence comes about, be it through intentional
development or the coalescence of massive computer networks, which Vinge says will
likely occur as “a great surprise and a greater unknown” (13). Vinge doesn’t suggest, like
Butler, that we should take the extreme route of destroying all modern technology to
avoid the Singularity. But he does note, “The dilemma felt by science fiction writers will
be perceived in other creative endeavors” (Vinge 14). The centuries-long prescience and
trepidation of fiction writers, by the 1990s, was coming to fruition.
By the time Vinge wrote “The Coming Technological Singularity,” computers
were a tangible reality, which contributed to the language and concerns of science fiction
writers. The science behind AI began, like many aspects of computer science and
robotics, with Alan Turing’s theory of computation, which essentially suggests that a
machine, using something as simple as binary code, could simulate any act of
mathematical deduction. This notion inspired the McCulloch-Pitts mathematical model of
the neuron in 1943, a physical and symbolic model that ultimately suggested that “the
human brain could be thought of as a computing device” (Hardesty). Although
advancements in cognitive science have expanded upon this conception of the human
brain, the McCulloch-Pitts neuron will be familiar to anyone that has vague memory of
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high school biology: the neuron has inputs that are either excitatory or inhibitory and a
threshold that determines how much excitation it needs to fire. These individual neurons
communicate with one another to create neural nets, which are collectively capable of
deriving conclusions from complex sets of information. The McCulloch-Pitts neuron has
informed cognitive science and computer science alike. Artificial neural nets have
allowed for machine learning, in which a computer learns to perform a task by analyzing
examples. However, McCulloch stops short of claiming that brains are computers,
writing, “Just because the theory is so general as to fit robot and man, it lacks the
specificity required to indicate mechanism in man to be the same as mechanism in robot”
(qtd. in Hayles 60). Arguably, the McCulloch-Pitts neuron’s largest cultural impact was
providing the language and perspective to shift both colloquial conversations about
technology and science fiction as a genre. The privileged relationship of the human to
information began to fall apart, and the rapid advancement of technology furthered that
erosion. Although it’s fair to say that no machine is currently capable of recreating
human intelligence, computer scientist Larry Tesler’s theorem states that artificial
intelligence is defined by whatever machines haven’t done yet (Hofstadter 601). The
features that constitute AI will continuously be altered as computers accomplish more
feats. Robots have already achieved significant milestones, including expertise in Go, a
3000-year-old game with considerably more legal board positions than there are atoms in
the observable universe (Koch). As the range of AI capabilities expand and deepen,
science fiction writers gain a wider depth of language and referents from which to
communicate concepts and more fodder for possible dystopian futures.
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Despite the advancements in computer science expanding the potential futures
depicted in science fiction, it is worth noting that many of their narratives are responses
to a novel published when the steam engine was gaining traction: Mary Shelley’s 1818
novel Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus. Foundational science fiction author
Isaac Asimov developed his Three Laws of Robotics to avoid what he calls the
“Frankenstein motive,” a relatively common, fear-mongering science fiction trope in
which a creation turns against his creator (Asimov 1975). Although many of Asimov’s
stories push against his own laws, pulling the strings of anticipated shortcomings and
ethical dilemmas, Asimov’s laws have gone on to be the unspoken rules of countless
science fiction works and have even provided an ethical basis for the development of
robots outside of the confines of fiction. The Three Laws of Robotics are that (1) a robot
cannot injure a human being or allow a human being to be harmed, (2) a robot must obey
human orders except where said orders conflict with the first law, and (3) a robot must
protect its own existence as long as it doesn’t conflict with the first or second law
(Asimov 1975). These programmed rules, in theory, would prevent a robot from taking
revenge on humans for consigning it to a life of servitude.
However, Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and Larissa
Lai’s “Rachel” are more concerned with what constitutes the difference between a
creation and its creator in the first place, a notion that pushes against the rigid rules of
Asimov and humanism in general. After all, Shelley’s monster, despite being as
introspective and intelligent as any other person, is rejected by his creator and society at
large because of his disturbing appearance. Victor Frankenstein brought something into
existence only to fear and loathe it, making the suffering he endures at the hands of his
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creation more ethically conflicted than the pop-culture interpretation as articulated by
Asimov allows. If someone intentionally creates conscious beings, and those conscious
beings will inevitably be exploited for their labor, then how is it ethical to fundamentally
inhibit the being’s ability to achieve fulfillment or emancipation? Dick’s perspective is
less grounded in human interests and more grounded in questioning the way we define
humanity, free will, and reality. Thus, Dick spent much of his writing career focused on
“liminal beings,” to borrow the terminology of Robert MacDougall (50). A liminal being,
according to MacDougall, is “any creature or entity that defies easy placement in a
particular category of existence” (50). This is certainly true of Frankenstein’s monster
and is equally true of the androids in Dick’s novel. The only difference is that Dick’s
androids aren’t distinguishable from humans as obviously as Shelley’s monster is.
This deliberate lack of distinguishability between the human and the nonhuman is
indicative that Dick is arguing for critical posthumanism in his novel. I disagree with the
humanist reading of this text offered by Robert MacDougall and Adam Pottle, as Dick
rejects both the notion of the human as exceptional and the autonomy that is intended to
emerge from the free market of liberal humanism. Dick captures a future in which the
nonhuman increasingly expresses traits that are typically assigned to the human while the
human loses those traits. Additionally, the attempt to discredit the empathy-based religion
Mercerism by exposing its phony genesis fails, symbolizing that the authenticity of one’s
perceptions do not depend upon the authenticity of their origins. In a 2004 adaptation of
Dick’s novel, Larissa Lai’s “Rachel” offers a similar defense of liminal beings. However,
Lai addresses the intersections of race, gender, and posthumanity through the rendering
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of Rachel’s subjectivity. The story draws striking similarities between the objectification
of Asian women and the objectification of androids in literature.
I. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? Dick offers a posthumanist critique of
the delineation between the organic and artificial through the depiction of the increasing
humanization of androids and increasing dehumanization of humans. Androids are
depicted with consciousness, memories, and interpersonal relationships while humans
grow more distant and emotionally sedated in the face of late-stage capitalism. Do
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is set on a barren and desolate Earth following a
nuclear war. Those privileged enough are given the ability to emigrate to Mars to escape
the radioactivity that plagues Earth and are provided with a free humanoid android. When
some of these androids begin to revolt and escape to Earth, police stations create the role
of the bounty hunter, officers who hunt and kill these fugitive androids. The story follows
bounty hunter Rick Deckard as he attempts to destroy a group of advanced Nexus-6
androids who have killed their human masters and fled to Earth in an attempt at
liberation. These androids are constructed from the same organic matter that constitutes
humans, meaning that the only concrete, quantifiable way to identify an android as such
is to sample their bone marrow for testing post-mortem. Bounty hunters like Deckard use
the Voigt-Kampff test before killing a potential android. This test assesses a capacity for
empathy, a human trait that androids are thought to lack.
One way that Dick puts pressure on humanism in the novel is through the
comparison of androids to slaves, which serves to justify the androids’ reasons for
escaping to earth. This is interwoven into the narrative from the very beginning of the
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text, when Deckard’s wife Iran refers to the androids Deckard kills to make a living as
“those poor andys” (4). Her pity for the androids infuriates Deckard, but when he goes to
work he is confronted with the information that the newest model of androids, the Nexus6, have surpassed several groups of humans in terms of intelligence. “The servant,”
Deckard notes, “has in some cases become more adroit than its master” (29). In a
Hegelian context, this poses a deep-seated threat to many of the human characters of the
novel, as the androids do much more for humans than humans do for androids. Despite
this, the androids, who were intelligent and independent enough in their earliest iterations
to be aware of their own exploitation, are difficult to demonize even from the novel’s
outset. In fact, the creation of the bounty hunter in response to escaped androids seeking
emancipation bears great similarity to the history of policing in the United States.
Although loosely organized watchmen were responsible for defending early colonial
communities, the origins of modern policing can be boiled down to slave patrols, the
suppression of labor uprisings, and xenophobia (Lepore). Quite literally, the androids in
Dick’s novel begin their lives in slavery, kill their masters, and run away to try to find
refuge. Garland, one of the androids, remarks that on Earth, “Every worm and wood
louse is considered more desirable than all of us put together” (113). The story of these
androids is not akin to Frankenstein’s monster seeking vengeance on his cowardly owner;
this is an allegory of runaway slaves seeking emancipated lives. This allegory is
explicitly alluded to when a television advertisement for the androids says that an android
“duplicates the halcyon days of the pre-Civil War Southern states!” (17). And it goes
without saying that stripping away the potential of humanity from these androids (to the
degree that they are not murdered but retired) also reflects the dehumanization of chattel
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slaves in American history. The historical context that the reader likely brings to a
reading of this text lays the groundwork for a sense of empathy for androids before they
ever appear in the text. Dick is clearly critiquing the humanist philosophy that did allow
slavery.
Eldon Rosen, the manufacturer of the Nexus-6 androids, warns that, despite the
ethical issues that arise from the enslavement of his creations, the androids will continue
to grow less distinguishable from humans in order to meet market demands. This lays the
groundwork for Dick’s critique of the negligence and greed that arises from free-market
capitalism. Deckard is sent to the Rosen Organization to verify that the Voigt-Kampff test
is effective at identifying the new Nexus-6 androids. It is established that police on Earth
are largely powerless to halt the private production of these androids, despite their
difficulty in identifying and retiring the escapees. This time, though, the top bounty
hunter in the city was seriously injured by a Nexus-6 android, making the threat to the
Rosen Organization more real than it’s ever been. Deckard reflects that “by coming here
he had brought the void to them, had ushered in emptiness and the hush of economic
death” (43). To the Rosens, their business could very well fail if the Nexus-6 stops being
produced, and Eldon Rosen believes that implementing a manufacturing ban simply
wouldn’t accomplish what the police hope it will. He argues, “We followed the timehonored principle underlying every commercial venture. If our firm hadn’t made these
progressively more human types, other firms in the field would have” (51). There is
demand for humanoid servants on the new, inhospitable home of the human race, and
Eldon Rosen is determined to be the person who profits from that demand. He insists,
likely correctly, that if he doesn’t manufacture increasingly advanced androids, a
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competitor will. He even sends Rachel, his android “niece,” to feign assistance to
Deckard when she really seeks to find precisely what traits confirm that a Nexus-6 is, in
fact, an android so that they can make a new and improved model. “And we then have the
Nexus-7,” Rachael tells Deckard, “And when that gets caught, we modify again and
eventually the association has a type that can’t be distinguished” (174). This is ultimately
where Dick’s critique of capitalism arises. The Rosen Association is solely motivated by
profit, so they don’t care to consider the implications of manufacturing an artificially
created human for the purposes of slave labor.
The human characteristics of these androids aren’t strictly observed in their
physical composition: androids like Luba Luft display an appreciation for art and selfawareness that suggests a level of humanity that supersedes organic composition. Jimena
Escudero Pérez writes in her exploration of tropes in science fiction featuring female
androids that “artistic sensibility and expression seem to determine these characters’
evolution much more than formal examination” (331). This certainly seems to be
Deckard’s impression of Luba. Luba Luft is a celebrated opera singer, and it’s clear that
Deckard feels more sentimentality and empathy towards Luba than other androids even
before he meets her: “Maybe Dave guessed wrong on her, he conjectured. I hope so”
(92). Her talent in opera singing, a distinctly human art form, endears her to him and
forces him to reckon with the value she adds to the world. She is contributing to human
culture in a way that other androids, it seems, are not interested in. She says that she
never liked androids and sought to replicate the actions and impulses of humans, which
she calls, “a superior life form” (Dick 124). But when Deckard does meet her, Luba
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confronts Deckard’s own lack of empathy and forces him to question the ethics of his
work:
“An android,” he said, “doesn’t care what happens to another android. That’s one
of the indications we look for.”
“Then,” Miss Luft said, “you must be an android.” (Dick 94)
This plants a seed of doubt in Deckard’s mind that was, on the surface, disproven when
he is tested and determined to be human later in the story. But the larger issue of
empathy, and his lack of it, is something that haunts him for the remainder of the
narrative.
On the other end of the humanoid spectrum is Roy Baty, a cruel and cold android
that mirrors the thoughts and behaviors of the supposedly human bounty hunter Phil
Resch. Baty is the leader of the group of androids who escape to earth, an action that is
described in a police report as in an attempt to attain “the sacredness of so-called android
‘life’” (Dick 169). Baty is willing to go to violent ends to achieve this goal, killing
various humans on Mars in order to get himself and his group to Earth. He strives to
achieve a heightened sense of empathy through drugs, but when it fails, he violently
rejects the idea of empathy and the sanctity of life. On the other hand, Phil Resch is a
bounty hunter that Deckard finds working in an ersatz police station headed by android
Inspector Garland. Garland claims that Resch is an android, and Luba Luft independently
asserts this when she is apprehended by Deckard and Resch. Resch quickly shows that
the coldness that is thought to exist in androids certainly exists in him as well. When
Luba provokes Resch by continually suggesting that he is an android posing as a human,
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he hastily and publicly shoots her. Deckard is shaken in this moment, asking Resch if he
thinks androids have souls. Resch is unbothered by her death, but Deckard thinks, “I
don’t get it; how can a talent like this be a liability to our society?” (Dick 126). At this
point, both Deckard and Resch are all but convinced that Resch, too, is an android, but
they both test as human. This leaves two equally disturbing explanations: that the test is
wildly inaccurate and Resch is, in fact, an android or that Resch is human and his lack of
empathy is just as human as the rest of him. By the time Deckard has to kill Roy, Roy’s
wife Irmgard, and Pris, an android that is identical to Rachel, his faith in the system and
in his own role as a bounty hunter is shaking. When Deckard shoots Irmgard, Roy cries
out in grief, which leads to a final epiphany for Deckard: “‘Okay, you loved her,’ Rick
said. ‘And I loved Rachael’” (Dick 205). Although Roy is one of the most callous
characters in the narrative, he still experiences love, which seems to be the common
denominator between the human and the android. After all, Resch is as insensitive as
Roy, yet maintains the title and privilege of being a human.
In Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, the distinction between the human and
the android is not only complicated by the organic composition and human urges of the
androids: the humans in the story have their own emotions and sense of empathy
supplanted by technological commodities. The opening scene of the novel shows
Deckard and Iran waking up in the morning with the help of a mood organ, a device that
can stimulate an unthinkably large range of emotions in a user. Iran shows skepticism
toward the mood organ and Deckard’s line of work long before Deckard grows
disillusioned, calling him a “crude cop” when he tries to convince her to use her mood
organ to wake up (3). In response to this insult, Deckard feels irritable, although “he

32
hadn’t dialed for it” (3). There is a sense that the normalized experience of emotions is
heavily scheduled and intentional in a way that feels artificial. Iran affirms this when she
reflects upon a time when she intellectually understood and perceived the emptiness of
the abandoned apartments around them without reacting emotionally because her mood
organ put her “in a 382 mood” (5). Iran says, “But that used to be considered a sign of
mental illness; they called it ‘absence of appropriate affect’” (5). In terms of how a
human is defined in this text and otherwise, the lack of appropriate emotional reactions
says a lot about the mass dehumanization caused by nuclear warfare and rampant
consumerism. This also alludes to the fact that what is considered “mental illness” shifts
with time. There is no objective test to measure the amount of mental illness someone
has. So when absence of appropriate affect becomes the norm, it stops being classified as
an abnormality. This points at the futility of testing the humanity of androids and the
cultural expectations and biases that created this test in the first place.
The absence of affect in humans is brought up again when Deckard is sent to
verify that the Voigt-Kampff test is effective at distinguishing humans from androids
after doubts about its efficacy arise. Russian psychiatrists have hypothesized that
schizophrenic humans that display a flattening of affect could potentially fail the VoigtKampff test. The chief tells Deckard, “If you tested them in line with police work, you’d
assess them as humanoid robots. You’d be wrong, but by then they’d be dead” (36).
Deckard tries to rationalize this undeniable possibility by noting that those who have the
highest potential to fail the test would likely be institutionalized before they ever
encountered a bounty hunter. Still, the fact that any human could fail a test that is solely
designed to discern a human from an android makes the test inherently invalid. It begs the
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question: what would happen if a human who was in a scheduled complacent mood, like
Iran, was subjected to the test? If they show an “absence of appropriate affect” like Iran
posits, then surely, they would have the same chance of failing the Voigt-Kampff test as
someone with psychosis. Before an android ever enters the text, the idea that an expected
and involuntary emotional response is the definitive distinction between the human and
the Other is deconstructed.
A strange religion called Mercerism arises to combat the lack of appropriate affect
present in the human population, which can be interpreted as Dick’s criticism of the role
of religion in late-stage capitalism. I argue that this critique is a relatively minor aspect of
its significance. Mercerism is the worship of a martyr figure named William Mercer, who
once had the ability to bring the dead to life before his powers were repressed by negative
figures only referred to as the killers. Thus, empathy and valuing life in all forms are
central to the worship of Mercer. The central image of Mercerism is that of William
Mercer infinitely ascending an otherworldly hill, being pelted by rocks thrown by these
killers. Most homes contain an empathy box, which is described as a small black box
with two handles for the user to hold onto. While using an empathy box, a person is
plunged into an immersive virtual reality in which they are fused with the endlessly
climbing William Mercer and all other people using their empathy boxes at the time. In
his essay comparing the dystopias in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and Blade
Runner, Christoph Houswitschka writes that every aspect of this society is commodified
and “hollow,” including the experience of Mercerism (130). I think that Dick views the
role of Mercerism in this society in much the same way as Marx saw the role of religion,
with Marx writing, “Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless
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world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (Marx 13). The
last part of this quote, ripped from its context, has been used by atheists to belittle
religion in recent years, but Marx doesn’t seem to be suggesting that religion is hollow in
the same sense that Houswitschka does. Although Marx was deeply critical of religious
institutions, he argued that religion could only be rendered unnecessary if material
conditions of the people improved. And it follows that as the material conditions of the
people on Earth decline in Dick’s novel, their reliance on religion for a sense of purpose
and connectedness only grows stronger.
That being said, the unveiling of Mercerism’s phony origins and the persistence
of its presence is an allegory for the significance of emotion among androids: the
authenticity of empathy and connectedness are not reliant on the authenticity of their
origins. J.R. Isadore, a physically isolated and disabled man, uses this technology as a
prosthesis for companionship, understanding, and even physical touch. Isadore says that
the empathy box is “an extension of your body; it’s the way you touch other humans, it’s
the way you stop being alone” (62). This device enables users to shed the perceived
isolation that plagues their embodied lives. Near the novel’s conclusion, Buster Friendly,
the star of the only television channel and covert android, airs a detailed exposé on the
false pretense behind Mercerism. The footage used in the empathy boxes depicting
Mercer walking up a hill while being struck by rocks was filmed on a soundstage with a
bit actor, not on another planet with a god-like figure. Despite this, both Isadore and
Deckard experience an enlightening encounter with Mercer shortly after this report airs.
When Isadore spirals into a panic after listening to the report, Mercer appears to him and
tells him, “They will have trouble understanding why nothing has changed. Because
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you’re still here and I’m still here” (198). The exposé does nothing to eliminate the need
that Mercer fills in the unfulfilling and hopeless lives of the people stranded on Earth, so
Mercerism will persist. Police around the world reported that the empathy and solidarity
that was fostered through Mercerism lowered crime rates, which goes to show how
central it is to a functioning society (70). Even Deckard, who wasn’t a strict adherent to
Mercerism at the beginning of the novel, goes as far as to claim that he has permanently
fused with Mercer by the novel’s conclusion, which causes him to perceive “life which
we can no longer distinguish; life carefully buried up to its forehead in the carcass of a
dead world” (219). Deckard’s encounter and deep sense of empathy with Mercer
ultimately gives him empathy toward life in its many forms, which for the first time
includes artificial life. The tangible effects of belief in Mercerism are far more
consequential than the veracity of its claims. Likewise, the androids’ experiences of
emotions like hope (i.e. their attempt at liberation), passion (i.e. Luba Luft’s opera
career), and love (i.e. The Batys) are as valid and palpable as the contrived human
experience of connectedness through Mercerism and the empathy box. The artificial
origins of the androids’ creation, much like that of William Mercer, are irrelevant.
Through the blurring of boundaries between the human and the machine, Dick
argues for critical posthumanism. By the conclusion, the protagonist loses much of the
biases he held against the nonhuman. Deckard expresses some disappointment when a
toad he finds in the desert is revealed to be artificial, but acknowledges that it is alive
regardless, an attitude he didn’t possess at the novel’s opening. Additionally, the
revelation that the roots of Mercerism are as artificial as the enslaved androids proves
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futile, as people maintain their faith regardless. This suggests, albeit subtly, a potential
shift in the public attitude toward the segregation of the organic and artificial.
Some scholars view Dick as arguing for humanism in this text, which I disagree
with. That being said, my disagreement generally lies with their characterization of
humanism and posthumanism. For instance, Adam Pottle argues that Dick’s novel
“criticizes eugenics as a posthuman endeavor” through the disenfranchisement of J.R.
Isadore, a character prohibited from reproducing or emigrating to Mars on the basis of his
radioactivity-induced brain damage (Pottle). I do agree with his reading of the novel,
particularly in that the evaluations used to categorize people (and androids) are
insufficient in capturing the vast diversity of experience. Isadore, as Pottle notes, “has
more empathy than any other character in the novel” (Pottle). Yet in a society that values
empathy above all else, he is relegated to an existence with no future. However, unlike
Pottle, I don’t think the conclusion of this novel, particularly in Deckard’s evolving
attitudes towards artificial beings, suggests a condemnation of posthumanism broadly.
Pottle writes, “Considered alongside the novel, the eugenics movement suggests that
those people who prize logic and intellect above all else are really aiming for a world of
androids, a world in which diversity, as signalled by animals and by persons with
disabilities, has been minimized, if not eliminated” (Pottle). This is certainly true of
eugenicists outside of the realm of Dick’s novel, but it’s clear in the novel that the
androids themselves have diverse personalities and interests, a notion that Pottle neglects.
But more importantly, they are also subjugated and enslaved, not celebrated for their
intellectual prowess. The critique of eugenics that Pottle suggests is happening in the
novel would make the androids the dominant race. However, the androids are not at the
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top of any hierarchy in the novel because Dick isn’t suggesting that the creation of
androids is a eugenicist effort. Instead, Dick criticizes the false dichotomies and
hierarchies that are generated and reinforced by humanist philosophy. Andrew
Zimmerman writes in “Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany” that “The
paradox of non-Europeans for the European human sciences … was that they were
human yet could not be acknowledged as possessing full ‘humanity.’ Humanist notions
of the self were both defined and profoundly threatened by the existence of humans who
Europeans regarded as inferior” (xiii). The individuality inherent to humanist philosophy
requires, in Hegelian terms, a subservient Other to recognize the dominant individual. A
European humanist valued humanity as defined by him, not humanity as defined by
nature. This false taxonomy of humans, from the idealized image of man to the barely
human Other, parallels the privileged position of the able-bodied, neurotypical human
and the literally barely-human android depicted in Dick’s novel. This is a distinguishably
posthumanist critique of the hierarchies that have defined the history of humanist
philosophy, as the android-Other is exploited, not celebrated.
Similarly to Pottle, Robert MacDougall writes that Dick’s work is “infused with a
gentle humanism,” which is represented by the “existential fear” that arises when faced
with the loss of Cartesian mind-body dualism (53). I can’t speak for Dick’s entire oeuvre,
but I don’t agree that Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? comes to humanist
conclusions. The existential conflict that arises in a character like Deckard when faced
with the loss of Cartesian mind-body dualism doesn’t suggest to me that the questioning
of these fundamental ideas is a bad thing. One will inevitably face trauma, for lack of a
better word, when one is confronted with new information that conflicts with one’s
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conception of the world or the self. I don’t think that Dick was writing existential crises
to suggest that the abandonment of humanism is an inherently bad idea. This
existentialism that results from the wavering of a character’s worldview is representative
of Dick’s criticism of the deeply intrenched humanist philosophy and anthropocentrism
in our understanding of the world. When Deckard has a strange revelation in the middle
of a desert after killing the last of the escaped androids, it isn’t suggested that his crisis is
unjustified or damaging. In fact, it seems that by the novel’s conclusion, Deckard has
come to a place of empathy with the technological life that surrounds him that he didn’t
have at the opening, telling his wife Iran, “But it doesn’t matter. The electric things have
their lives, too. Paltry as those lives are” (Dick 222). When Iran offers to program his
mood organ to “long deserved peace,” she finds that Deckard falls asleep with that peace
without the help of the technological device. Despite Deckard’s reckoning with his own
view of the world and his role in it, the end isn’t hopeless and negative. The
existentialism Deckard contends with is evidence of his perspective shifting in light of
the new experiences he gains throughout the novel.
Due in part to this change in perspective, I don’t think that Do Androids Dream of
Electric Sheep? is an argument against the development of androids. It does, however,
offer a critique similar to that of Donna Haraway in “A Cyborg Manifesto,” that the
cyborg is “the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism” (227).
Dick’s critique of androids in his novel is not that they exist, but a critique of the reasons
that they exist. In a literal act of playing God, people create the androids in man’s image
by purposefully giving them vivid memories of an imagined past and the potential to
develop relationships and grow emotionally. The creation of these specific androids is
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anthropocentric narcissism at its peak. But despite their purposeful mimicry of human
consciousness, they are subsequently forced into menial labor for the sake of costeffectiveness, colonialism, and leisure of their human counterparts. The reach beyond the
uncanny valley between the human and the Other was solely motivated by profit and the
colonization of a planet uninhabitable to humans. The center of Dick’s critique here is of
liberal humanism and late capitalism, not the presence of artificial life as a whole.
II. “Rachel”
Haraway envisioned a future in which the hierarchies of gender, race, and class
are rendered impotent by cyborg subjects and identities, but this future doesn’t exist in
Dick’s novel or Larissa Lai’s short story “Rachel.” Although Lai gives Rachel1 a
narrative voice that she doesn’t have elsewhere, the hierarchies regurgitated in this
fictional world prevent Rachel from living out Haraway’s vision of a cyborg future, in
which “the relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and
hierarchical domination, are at issue” (227). Instead, Rachel’s experience of android
subjectivity, so to speak, is anything but devoid of binaries and hierarchies. Her identity
as an Asian android woman subjects her to unique, polarizing stereotypes: of the demure
and submissive lotus flower (or Stepford Wife) and the aggressive and hypersexual
dragon lady (or fembot). Even though Rachel doesn’t ascribe much importance to her
race or gender, they continue to impact her embodied existence. Lai offers complex

The spelling of this character’s name differs between Dick’s novel (“Rachael”) and Lai’s story
(“Rachel”). I will be using the spelling that applies to the character as she appears in these
respective works.
1
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subjectivity for an android in an oppressive system as well as a critique of popular
science fiction’s hesitancy to do the same.
In both Dick’s novel and Ridley Scott’s film adaptation Blade Runner, android
subjectivity is not explored and the audience observes them through strictly human
perspectives. Dick’s novel is narrated in third-person perspective, but all the reader learns
about androids is what human focal characters like Deckard and Isadore know or
experience, which is tainted by misunderstandings and prejudice. In translating the
premise of the novel to film, Scott’s Blade Runner depicts androids (called “replicants” in
the film) as visibly less human than are Dick’s androids. For instance, while Pris dies a
human death at the end of Deckard’s gun in Dick’s novel, the Pris of Blade Runner is
seen thrashing unnaturally and mechanically after being shot by Deckard multiple times.
The replicants in the film also have a tell-tale amber glow in their eyes, a seemingly nondiegetic quality that is solely included for the benefit of the audience, as it is never
addressed within the film. Although both of these works are certainly focused on
compromising the hard line drawn between the human and the non-human, the androids
remain distant from the audience due to aesthetic and narrative choices.
Nearly 40 years after the publication of Dick’s novel, Larissa Lai gave Dick and
Scott’s android a voice and direct connection to the audience in the short story “Rachel.”
This short story is based on Scott’s film, which is relevant because Rachel’s character
differs significantly between Dick’s novel and its film adaptation. In Dick’s novel,
Rachael is a far less sympathetic character than the Rachel of Lai’s story or Scott’s film.
Rachael feigns ignorance of her android identity until Deckard tests her, when she had
been having sex with bounty hunters to dissuade them from killing androids long before
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she met Deckard. He believes that this manipulative use of Rachael’s sexuality was
orchestrated by her creator, Eldon Rosen, saying, “Rachael, the prototype, used by the
manufacturer to protect the others” (Dick 203). Until Deckard, Rachael claims to be
100% successful at ending the careers of bounty hunters. However, after having sex with
Rachael, Deckard goes on to kill the final 3 androids, one of whom is an exact copy of
Rachael’s model. In fury, Rachael pushes Deckard’s newly purchased Nubian goat from
the roof of his apartment complex. She weaponizes her sexuality in attainment of a
duplicitous goal and is quite willing to use violence to that end as well, which makes it
difficult to empathize with her. In fact, it’s difficult to empathize with any of the women
in Dick’s story, who are either portrayed as frigid or ignorant. In Blade Runner, however,
Rachel is genuinely traumatized upon learning that she is an android with implanted
memories, which were donated by the manufacturer’s niece. She finds Deckard and
shows him a photo of her and her mother to affirm that she is a human, and he rattles off
a few of her deepest memories, which confirms that she is an android. A memorable
scene depicts Rachel taking her hair down and playing the piano, saying that she
remembers taking piano lessons, but is unsure if she actually took those lessons or if her
ability to play the piano derives from someone else’s implanted memories. She and
Deckard (who is unmarried in this movie) ultimately end up on the run together by the
end of the film. The function of this character—and indeed, the basic traits of the
character—changes drastically in their respective narratives. The Rachael of Dick’s novel
manipulates bounty hunters to advance the capitalist interests of her manufacturer while
the Rachel of Scott’s film and Lai’s story is passive and introspective.
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Lai’s story begins with Rachel and Deckard’s first encounter, although Deckard is
only ever referred to as “the policeman,” stripping him of his individuality in the same
way Rachel is stripped of hers in Dick’s novel. Rachel’s body is not her own. Other
androids are manufactured using the same body, one of which Deckard must kill.
Rachel’s memories are not her own either. “Whose memories are these?” she asks herself
in Lai’s story (112). In the novel, the memories seem to have been generated from
nothing, but in the film they were donated to her by a human who had experienced them
first. She is composed of parts that aren’t unique to her and is viewed as a commodity or
menace more than what she is: a person. By appropriating Dick’s well-developed
protagonist and reducing him to simply “the policeman,” Lai defines him strictly by the
role he plays in Rachel’s life, which serves to balance the scales between the two texts.
The policeman uses the Voigt-Kampff test on Rachel, who is certain that she will not fail
because she has no reason to believe that she is not a person. “I know who I am,” she
thinks, a tragic piece of dramatic irony (Lai 91). She has intelligent thought, rationality,
subjectivity, and emotion. However, the policeman, with his “nasty light” and
uncomfortable scrutiny, deems that Rachel isn’t, in fact, human (Lai 91). This revelation
is traumatic, stripping her of any sense of stability she felt in her own subjectivity. She
sees through mass-produced eyes and thinks using the scaffolding of someone else’s
memories.
The societal refusal of Rachel’s subjectivity grows only stronger when
considering the intersection of her android and female identities. In an analysis of
artificial women in film, Escudero Pérez writes that “whenever a robot or AI is assigned a
female gender it is for sexual purposes” (328). Male (or masculine androgyny) is the
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default, and the only reason to make a female-coded machine is to craft a sexual object.
They are programmed to be subservient or hypersexual, designed to meet the desires of
any fetishist. The voyeuristic observation and objectification that the androids are put
through in the parent texts are reflected on from the perspective of the object in Lai’s
story. She talks about the policeman “scrutinizing” her (91). She is just within earshot
when the policeman asks her father, “How can it not know what it is?” (93). For her
pronouns to shift from “she” to “it” reveals the objectification of the android. She is
suddenly perceived as a machine instead of a conscious person. This adds to the
objectification she already experiences as a woman, evidenced in the scene in both
Scott’s film and Lai’s story that depicts Deckard’s violent response to Rachel’s
discomfort following his sexual advances. He pushes her against a wall and demands that
she ask him to kiss her. Rachel says, “When the policeman tells me what he wants, I can
only reflect his desire back to him. Is that because I am eighteen and inexperienced or
because I am nothing more than a wind-up doll? He treats me like a wind-up doll” (Lai
117). The intersection of Rachel’s identity as an android, which is seen as a literal
mechanized object, and her identity as a woman, which is sexually objectified, seems to
result in Deckard’s ability to treat her this way without guilt or second thought. The scene
in Scott’s film is polarizing, as some interpret it as romantic while others find it troubling.
Reading the same interaction from Rachel’s perspective in Lai’s story makes it easier for
the audience to skew toward the latter interpretation.
In Lai’s story, Rachel is half white and half Asian, a choice that illuminates the
alarming similarities in the ways that Asian women and android women are fetishized.
Escudero Pérez writes that artificial women are generally sorted into one of two polarized
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categories in fiction: “the promiscuous, dangerous and aggressive doll, whose
hypersexualization helped her accomplish deadly missions … at the other end of the
spectrum, the Victorian angel in the house figure: a perfectly obedient, subjugated
housewife” (326). Consider Dick’s interpretation of Rachel in Do Androids Dream of
Electric Sheep? as fitting into the first category: her hypersexuality is used to manipulate
bounty hunters and she brutally kills Deckard’s beloved goat. On the other end of the
spectrum are characters like the Stepford wives featured in Ira Levin’s novel of the same
name. The Stepford wives in particular are designed from the ground up to be a man’s
perfect spouse, but this trope can be expanded to female androids that can be easily
manipulated and serve to please men. In a strikingly similar dichotomy, an American
Psychological Association study of the gendered racial microaggressions experienced by
Asian American women identifies that “AAW [Asian American women] were
stereotyped as both the ‘lotus blossom baby’ (e.g. China doll, geisha girl, and the shy
Polynesian beauty) and the ‘dragon lady,’ or prostitutes and devious madams” (Keum et
al. 573). Lotus blossom babies are characterized by passivity and innocence while dragon
ladies are overtly sexual and insidious. Asian and android women are fetishized using the
same binary roles, from a dangerous and promiscuous femme fatale to a naïve
subservient. And in a general sense, both of these groups are exotic to white male
subjects, which makes them an even more desirable target of objectification. Lai’s
interpretation of Rachel as half-Asian reveals the ways in which her passivity and
innocence are not only used to fetishize fictional androids, but contemporary Asian
women.
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There is also an (uncomfortable) focus on immaturity that lends another similarity
to the fetishization of these two groups. In Dick’s novel, androids only live for 4 years,
which means that an android woman in a mature body would remain relatively sheltered
and naïve. For instance, when Deckard performs the Voigt-Kampff test on Luba Luft, she
asks what a wasp is, to which he answers:
“A stinging bug that flies.”
“Oh, how strange.” Her immense eyes widened with child-like acceptance, as if
he had revealed the cardinal mystery of creation.” (Dick 95)
The power that a man receives when he is the filter through which a sexual prospect
obtains knowledge or experiences is certainly a factor in the fetishization of these
childlike qualities. On a physical level, it is reiterated throughout the novel that Rachael’s
figure is “childlike” and is routinely identified as a “girl” (Dick 172; 88). This fixation on
Rachael’s adolescence is troubling because Deckard has sex with her near the conclusion
of the novel. Asian women are fetishized in a similar sense, as Patricia Park notes while
reflecting upon her interactions with members of an MIT fraternity: “As they
deconstructed the female body, they ticked off features like they were taking inventory:
Asian women had dark eyes, straight black hair, petite frames, and small hands” (29).
Although Dick avoids the topic of race throughout most of his novel, it’s notable that
Rachael exhibits all four of those physical qualities. By giving Rachel an Asian identity,
Lai draws out the ways in which the fetishization of Asian women is dehumanizing, as
these nonhuman android characters are subjected to the same polarizing categories.
Fetishization necessitates a dehumanization of the object, in the first place. However, Lai
also seems to make the case that the androids in this narrative —who were only
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accessible through white male subjectivity until Lai gave Rachel a voice —are just as
deserving of respect and equality as their Asian counterparts.
Lai also offers a critique of the lack of diverse representation in popular science
fiction through one of Rachel’s implanted memories. In this memory, Rachel is a young
girl entering her school's Halloween costume contest as an “Indian Princess” (Lai 92).
She reminisces:
I brushed my long black hair straight and darkened my skin with cocoa powder
mixed with water. I expected to win, since all the other kids wore costumes that
were obviously store-bought. I was devastated when the boy in the Darth Vader
mask won. It seemed the teachers placed no value whatsoever on creativity and
imagination. (Lai 92)
Given the established stereotype of the Indian Princess being used in reference to
indigenous Americans, I am assuming that “Indian” is not in reference to the people of
India. Dressing up as indigenous Americans is an unfortunate aspect of American culture,
from the Boston Tea Party to modern Halloween costumes. The Indian Princess
stereotype, however, differs in characterization from the manipulation of the “savage”
stereotype that was taken advantage of during the Boston Tea Party. The Indian Princess,
much like the demure female android and lotus baby Asian woman, serves to appeal and
attend to white men. Consider the popular, largely fictionalized narrative of Pocahontas: a
humane princess prevents her barbaric counterparts from killing an English man, who she
ultimately falls in love with. Narratives like these, alongside the dehumanization and
degradation of indigenous populations, has cultivated a reality in which the majority of
indigenous American women experience sexual violence in their lifetime (Rosay). The
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creativity that Rachel uses to create this costume only serves to reinforce harmful
stereotypes, suggesting that she has internalized racist narratives and imagery.
Notably, though, Rachel’s costume loses to a basic Darth Vader costume, which
is the core of Lai’s critique of popular science fiction and fantasy. It is a statement about
how cliché stories starring white men made for white men dominate over any stories
featuring people of color. In a study conducted to determine the demographics of science
fiction readers, Denise Morales Soto determined that although contemporary science
fiction readers are more diverse than ever, publishers continue to create and push content
intended for white, male audiences. Morales Soto writes that “there seems to be a
disconnect between the readers and the publishers” (12). The narratives that do feature
people of color tend to perpetuate tired stereotypes and tropes, like the Indian Princess
that Rachel dresses up as. The Arthur C. Clarke Award, an award given to UK-based
science fiction novels, publishes annual reflections on their submission demographics.
Although submissions by female authors increased from 13% in 2007 to 40% in 2020,
award judge Stewart Hotson writes that there were more books with “unacceptable racial
stereotypes or tropes” submitted than books by authors of color (Hotson). Calling for a
diversity of representation simply isn’t good enough, as that representation can be used to
reinforce detrimental narratives and stereotypes. The novelty and intended diversity that
initiated Rachel’s construction of her costume lost to a normative, played-out costume
because even offensive representations of women of color have trouble breaking through
to readers.
Andrea Smith, writing on the startlingly common experience of sexual assault on
indigenous American women, notes that “The issues of colonial, race, and gender
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oppression cannot be separated” (71). This intersectionality is inherent to every person’s
subjectivity and how they experience their embodied lives. Rachel’s racial and gender
identity deeply impact the way she is perceived by others. Her existence as an android
proves to be yet another subjugated identity that unfortunately furthers the othering she
faces due to her race and gender.
The androids as portrayed in Dick’s novel are inspired by a precedent of classism
and slave labor, but Lai demonstrates how the persisting hierarchies of gender and race
exacerbate the prejudice faced by an android like Rachel. Both authors are dedicated to
deconstructing the humanist sentiment that delineates hard distinctions between the
superior human and inferior nonhuman. Unlike a human, the androids in these narratives
are manufactured, not born. They are, however, composed of organic matter like a human
is. The test developed to distinguish humans from androids is rendered inadequate as the
androids become exponentially more complex and the humans are driven to apathy and
mental illnesses. Both of these factors make the test unable to reliably determine the
differences between the humans and the androids. Rachel’s narrative voice, as provided
by Lai, expresses the subjectivity and emotion that the android possesses. Jeremy
Bentham’s threshold for determining if a being is worthy of dignity and respect is
whether the being can suffer. Between the androids’ drive to escape the confines of
slavery, Roy Baty’s cry of anguish as his wife dies, and Rachel’s heartbreak upon
learning that she is not the human she assumed she was, it is abundantly clear that the
androids can, and do, suffer. Despite the overwhelming evidence that androids are worthy
of personhood, they are flatly denied civil rights and the traits that define the human are
adjusted in response to the evolution of the android. This parallels the hypocrisy of the
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central figures in humanist philosophy, as they generally considered various groups of
people “less human” than white, male, educated Europeans. Dick and Lai both argue that
the idea that some people are “less human” than others not only poses a threat to
hypothetical androids in an imagined future; it poses a threat to groups and identities that
exist today.
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Chapter 2: Prostheses
A posthuman subject need not be a fictional android composed of entirely
artificial materials. The use of prosthetics is another feature of the posthuman present and
the imagined future. For much of the 19th century, anthropologists and naturalists defined
the human by their propensity for using tools (Hayles 34). However, Kenneth Oakley
amended this statement in 1949 after animals were observed using tools, describing man
as a tool-maker rather than a tool-user. N. Katherine Hayles writes of Oakley’s work,
“Significantly, he imagined the tool to be at once ‘detachable’ and an ‘extension,’
separate from yet partaking of the hand” (34). In many cases, tools function as
prosthetics, inorganic materials created to extend human capabilities in some way. In this
context, think of the prosthetic as replacing a body part that only exists as a hypothetical,
or mimicking the body part of another creature. Rudimentary stone tools created by early
humans, for instance, only succeed in scraping the meat off a bone if it is wielded by a
person. Likewise, humans didn’t (and still don’t) possess the physiology needed to clean
a bone without these stone tools. At the very least, they couldn’t have accomplished their
goal as efficiently without using these tools as a prosthetic. Hayles writes that the critical
posthumanist “thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so
that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a
process that began before we were born” (3). The drive of the human to supersede bodily
limitations using inorganic compounds is arguably a central component of who we are as
a species. I would posit that, if anything, the human is defined by its desire to transcend
human limitations. This is why Hayles imagines the posthuman not as an aspirational
physical state, but as a key component of our past, present, and future.

51
The term “prosthetic” is primarily associated with the prosthetic limbs that can
help those with disabilities in their daily lives, which lends a well-deserved positive
attribution to the term. Events like the Paralympics have brought awareness to the use of
prosthetics to not just get by, but to thrive. The decreasing cost of 3-D printers and plastic
filament provides more affordable access to rudimentary, but lightweight prosthetic arms
and hands, which is particularly useful for growing children. Even devices as
commonplace as vision correcting eyeglasses are prosthetics. Glasses can also add unique
value that human physiology alone is incapable of, like the UV light protection offered
by sunglasses or protection from debris offered by safety glasses. Similarly, prosthetic
devices designed for those with limb deficiencies can also strive beyond simply
recreating a human limb. As depicted in The Guardian segment Beyond Bionics: How the
Future of Prosthetics is Redefining Humanity, a drummer named Jason Barnes lost his
right arm in an accident and upgraded from duct-taping a drumstick to his residual limb
to using a prosthetic that holds two drumsticks. They can even beat at different speeds,
allowing him to create polyrhythms that he could not have achieved with two hands (The
Guardian). Through the use of a prosthetic, Barnes didn’t just regain his ability to play
music; he attained abilities that he was not capable of prior to his accident.
Using prosthetics to push beyond the realm of human physiology isn’t a
phenomenon that is limited to those with physical disabilities. For instance, Temple
Grandin, an autism and animal rights activist, has reflected on the ways that technology
has behaved as a prosthesis in her work. Much of her work addresses the creation of more
humane ways to care for (and slaughter) livestock. Early in her career, she redesigned a
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crude system used for the kosher slaughter of cattle in a way that would support and
comfort the animal in its final moments. Grandin writes:
Through the machine, I reached out and held the animal. When I held his head in
the yoke, I imagined placing my hands on his forehead and under his chin and
gently easing him into position. Body boundaries seemed to disappear… The
parts of the apparatus that held the animal felt as if they were an extension of my
own body, similar to the phantom limb effect. (qtd. in Wolfe 135)
On the surface, the thought of using a metallic slaughter device as an act of love is hard
to understand. But Grandin sees the device as an opportunity to soothe the animal in a
way that was not possible without the aid of this technology and accepts the machine as
an extension of her body.
Likewise, robots like da Vinci Systems allow surgeons to perform minimally
invasive surgeries that were once inconceivable. This technology allows a surgeon to sit
in the operating room with their face and arms inside of a machine, which has handles to
control tiny, robotic instruments and foot controls to magnify and focus the 3-D cameras
that allow the surgeon to have vision with depth perception (“How”). A video, which has
since circulated on Twitter as a meme, shows the little manipulator and scissors of the da
Vinci surgical system gingerly cutting, peeling, and stitching the skin of a grape.
Professor of surgery Scott Eggener, MD says that this surgical method results in less
invasive surgeries, less blood loss, and less need for pain medication (Eggener). A decade
ago, this technology seemed like it leapt from a work of science fiction. Now, there are
nearly 6,000 of these machines in hospitals worldwide, and 8.5 million surgical
procedures have been conducted using da Vinci systems (Guthart). Like traditional
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surgery, a trained surgeon conducts the operation. The only difference is that they use
precise prosthetic hands and eyes to do so.
But what happens when the use of prosthetics has negative implications? Despite
the countless ways that prosthetics can change lives for the better, concern about the
possibility of prosthetics as a nefarious force has gripped science fiction for hundreds of
years, often through the depiction of cyborgs. A cyborg (short for “cybernetic organism’)
is an organic being that is augmented with technology or prosthetics. The concept of a
human whose body parts have been replaced by cybernetic ones has long been used as a
warning against manipulative uses of technology. Jason W. Ellis writes that the
monstrosity of film and literary cyborgs derives from “a perceived threat to humanity by
technology through its transformation, control, or infiltration” (Ellis). Doctor Who’s
Cybermen and the eponymous RoboCop exemplify the dangers of private corporations
attempting to develop the ideal human being, with these cyborgs being weaponized and
utilized as tools. A concern with the social issues surrounding the use of prosthetics can
be traced back much earlier to Edgar Allan Poe's 1839 short story “The Man That Was
Used Up,” which explores the all-consuming effects of war through the depiction of a
general whose body consists of various objects that must be assembled by a servant.
Indeed, 19th century American wars are largely responsible for the creation of the modern
prosthetics industry, with the Civil War leaving over 70,000 veterans with lost limbs
(MacRae). Although the imagery of this general soliloquizing while being assembled is
rather disturbing, it’s clear that Poe’s story asserts that war is responsible for his strange
existence; it used him up, as the title suggests. As prosthetics increase in popularity and
complexity, the age-old concerns about the use of prosthetics to perpetuate inequality,
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mitigate unnecessary conflict, or manipulate human bodies for covert purposes have
persisted within fictional representations. The short stories that appear in this chapter
address the finitude that technology shares with organic creatures and the abuse of
prosthetic technology to force assimilation or generate profit for corporations.
Malka Older’s short story “The Black Box: These Memories are Made to Last
Forever” is an exploration of the broad implications of a small, fallible technological
prosthetic becoming a societal norm. The Lifebrarian is a device installed in the brain that
records every waking moment of the user’s life, which allows memories to be recalled in
life or after the user’s death. It is intended to be used as both a memory device for the
living user and to eulogize the user’s memories after death. The story follows Sumi from
infancy to death. Sumi has a Lifebrarian installed in her brain as a toddler. The presence
of this device forces her to contend with her privacy and mortality throughout her life,
and her relationship with her Lifebrarian shifts over time. Ultimately, her mid-life
investment in the new “Black Box” protection upgrade proves fruitless by the story’s
conclusion. The files stored inside the device are corrupted following a devastating
earthquake.
“Lingua Franca” by Carole McDonnell shows how technological prosthesis, in
conjunction with imperialism, can be weaponized to erase cultures and reinforce the
hegemonic language and body norms of a colonizer. McDonnell’s story is set on an
unnamed planet inhabited by an entirely deaf population. When humans from Earth
establish trade on the planet, they begin fitting the native population with implants that
allow them to hear and speak. However, these new “abilities” prove to be unsuitable for
their native environment and stifling to their religious and cultural traditions.
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“Jon” by George Saunders features a group of teenagers who are permanently
housed in a marketing facility beginning in early childhood. This alone would give an
adolescent a skewed sense of reality, but these teenagers have also lived their entire lives
with an advertisement chip in their brains, which heavily influences the referents used in
their thoughts and language. When Jon’s girlfriend Carolyn becomes pregnant and
decides to leave the facility, he is forced to decide whether he wants to continue living
the life of luxury he has always known or opt to leave and remove the advertisement
chip, which risks permanently damaging his brain.
These stories invoke distinct dystopian visions: Older depicts a near-future that
parallels many of the ethical dilemmas that arise concerning Internet usage among
children in our contemporary world, McDonnell describes the vestiges of Earthly
colonialism and ableism extending far beyond our home planet, and Saunders creates a
hyper-consumerist, sanitized hellscape. The stories posit a range of concerns about the
potential use of technological prosthetics: Older is concerned with privacy and fallibility,
McDonnell with cultural erasure and the increasing invasion of imperialism, and
Saunders with the effects of capitalism on the way these prosthetics are utilized. They all,
however, explore the ways that these miniscule technological apparatuses are capable of
dramatically changing one’s subjectivity, which suggests that the mind does not, in fact,
transcend the physical form it exists in. It is of critical importance, as these stories imply,
that technological prosthesis be used ethically.
I. “The Black Box”
“The Black Box” opens with Sumi’s parents arguing about the effects of installing
a Lifebrarian in their daughter’s one-year-old brain, which mimics contemporary debates
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about the ethics of exposing young children to the Internet. Liliana, Sumi’s mother,
expresses concerns about the age of her young daughter, especially since the installation
of a Lifebrarian is an elective surgery. Liliana’s claim that the Lifebrarian could “affect
the way her brain evolves” is not dissimilar to the modern discourse surrounding child
Internet usage and the instant information access we have at our fingertips. Pew Research
Center found that seven-in-ten parents think that the potential harm of children under 11
owning smartphones outweighs the potential benefits (Auxier et al). An anonymous 49year-old father responded, “Technology has taught kids instant gratification and no
patience” (Auxier et al). This parallels the concerns of Liliana in Older’s story, who
argues to her husband, “Imagine if you never had to remember anything” (Older). The
presence of a Lifebrarian is a more pervasive form of instant gratification than even a cell
phone, as a child with a Lifebrarian could recall information learned in a classroom
instantly with photographic accuracy. Cheating on a test would no longer involve a cell
phone sitting subtly on a student’s lap; it would be invisible.
However, much like the inevitability of exposing young children to advanced
technology, the Lifebrarian becomes ubiquitous despite these criticisms, in part because it
allows children to remain competitive with their peers. Sumi’s father, Hideyoshi, seems
to represent this angle of the debate: “Hideyoshi didn’t feel as strongly about it. A lot of
people were having it done for their kids at that point” (Older). The potential risks and
ethical dilemmas are minimized in his mind because the procedure has become so
common. Similarly, Pew’s study on parents’ use of the Internet found that 83% of parents
share information about their children online, with 35% referencing that they choose to
do this because other parents do (Auxier et al). Just as connectedness with family and
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friends justifies sharing information about children online, Liliana’s concerns about the
Lifebrarian are mitigated by the perceived positive outcomes of the surgery. Hideyoshi’s
parents are even paying for the surgery because it was seen as “something you did for
your kids, to arm them with the best bodyware for a highly competitive future” (Older). If
a child does not have a Lifebrarian, they will struggle to attain the productivity and
success of a peer with a photographic memory. The popularity of the Lifebrarian puts
children who don’t have one at a stark disadvantage.
Despite the possibility of hindering Sumi’s future by not outfitting her with a
Lifebrarian, one-year-old Sumi is unable to consent to this operation, which parallels the
real ethical issues that go along with sharing photos, videos, and information about
children on social media. Most modern children have digital footprints before they can
speak, some before they’re even born. Older digital natives may have old, embarrassing
content online, but for the most part, they posted it themselves, even if they were too
young to understand the implications of it. Young children certainly can’t make informed
decisions about their presence online, let alone babies or fetuses. But the most troubling
aspect of this is that for parents, their child’s lack of autonomy or consent doesn’t seem to
faze them. Pew found that 83% of parents who post information about their children on
social media rarely or never worry that their children may someday be upset about the
things posted about them on social media (Auxier et al). The phenomenon of sharing a
child’s personal information online begs the same questions as installing a Lifebrarian
does in Older’s story. The story prompts the reader to consider uncomfortable questions:
does a child’s lack of privacy starting at birth affect their sense of self? Does it make
them more tolerant of surveillance? Older represents the conflict surrounding the
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implications of undermining a child’s privacy through Sumi’s parents’ clash over the
Lifebrarian surgery. In fact, this scene represents one of the final moments of Sumi’s life
that wouldn’t be permanently documented. Older writes that for the final time, “as soon
as Sumi’s short-lived consciousness of [the memory] melted away, it was gone forever”
(Older). The events of the rest of her narrative—and indeed, the rest of her life—will be
surveilled and archived without her consent and without any in-text suggestion that the
device can be removed.
Sumi’s attitude regarding her own privacy shifts over the course of her life, but
the presence and function of the Lifebrarian is obstinate in the face of her changing
perspective. When Sumi is 16, she acts out what she refers to as “childish superstition” in
an attempt to reason with the Lifebrarian, even though she knows it cannot be reasoned
with (Older). When she desperately wants to delete a bad memory, she tries to completely
empty her mind, and “sometimes she would even try to make a deal with the Lifebrarian,
as if it were a person. As if it were God” (Older). A deity may be the only language we
have to describe how the presence of a Lifebrarian would affect a person. God (in the
Abrahamic sense) is omnipotent, and although the Lifebrarian cannot access others’
points of view, it’s “all-seeing” in terms of the user’s subjectivity. Sumi’s anxiety
surrounding the contents of her Lifebrarian in young age shifts as she reaches her forties.
She decides while on a business trip to get the “Black Box” protective casing installed
around her Lifebrarian, which would make her recall function much slower but would
work to preserve her memories in the event of a disaster. Sumi reflects, “She will know in
that second of consciousness before she goes that someone will be able to see exactly
what happened to her” (Older). This choice trades Sumi’s total memory recall for the
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security of knowing that her loved ones would know what happened to her before death,
which is a change in perspective that makes sense with age. She not only has to consider
her mortality in a different way, but she also must consider the family she would leave
behind.
In a twist of fate, Sumi’s adolescent deal-making with the Lifebrarian comes to
fruition in the story’s conclusion: the hardware of her Lifebrarian is corrupted before it
can ever be accessed. Although Older’s story doesn’t directly offer an exploitative
ulterior motive behind the implementation of the Lifebrarian as a technological
prosthetic, it does offer important questions about privacy, consent, and the reliability of
technology. The last point in particular is something that isn’t referenced in the other two
stories. It goes without saying that technology has vastly different strengths than those of
organic beings. It can be intentionally designed to withstand a wide range of
environments and perform tasks that humans can’t dream of accomplishing. However,
like humans, technological devices are fallible. They can become infected with viruses,
they can malfunction and glitch, and they can develop or be manufactured with
unexpected anomalies. It’s easy to romanticize programming and robotics as fields of
pure, straightforward logic, of determining the best possible product and recreating it
indefinitely with no variability. In many of the works of fiction that appear in this thesis,
scientists and programmers are depicted as cold, logical beings who embody the
humanist ideal of rationality. But the uncomfortable reality is that there are variables that
cannot be avoided. Many can’t even be anticipated, in spite of complex algorithms and 3D models. This is what makes stories like Older’s so important: fiction forces us to
consider the possible outcomes of imminent or imagined advancements in technology.

60
II. “Lingua Franca”
One possible technological outcome, beyond the passive failure of technology, is
the active use of technology as cultural erasure. Carole McDonnell’s short story “Lingua
Franca” depicts a planet inhabited by humanoid aliens who have adapted to the noisiness
caused by their planet’s dense atmosphere through deafness. When hearing people from
Earth settle and begin to buy their natural resources, they enforce use of the English
language as well as installing implants that make the Deaf natives hearing, an additional
level of colonial invasion that burrows into the actual structure of the mind and how it
reacts to its environment. Unlike Older’s story, this narrative depicts a child that consents
to the installation of this hearing prosthesis against her mother’s wishes. The protagonist,
Mist, is a tradeswoman who is wary of the cultural impact these implants may have, and
is horrified when her adolescent daughter, Flowers-in-the-Sun, gets implants without her
knowledge.
McDonnell’s “Lingua Franca,” like Lai’s “Rachel,” was published in So Long
Been Dreaming, a postcolonial sci fi short story anthology. The introduction, written by
editor Nalo Hopkinson, a prominent contributor to postcolonial science fiction, contends
with the fascination with colonialism within the genre. Hopkinson writes, “Arguably, one
of the most familiar memes of science fiction is that of going to foreign countries and
colonizing the natives, and as I’ve said elsewhere, for many of us, that’s not a thrilling
adventure story; it’s non-fiction, and we are on the wrong side of a strange-looking ship
that appears out of nowhere” (Hopkinson 2). Indeed, science fiction broadly romanticizes
colonization as exploration, which reflects the doctrines and rationalizations of the West.
The experiences of the colonized are anything but fictional, even if they’re not usually
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addressed in traditional science fiction narratives. In “Lingua Franca,” McDonnell
explores the loss of culture that follows the loss of language, a common occurrence in
nonfictional colonization that is underrepresented in science fiction.
From the story’s opening, the colonizer—specifically the English language of the
Earth natives—invades the space of the native people and their language, even though
spoken English is inefficient in the planet’s environment. Mist stops at a fruit stand and
notes, “The name of the fruit was written in the three regional ideographic dialects in
addition to the lingua franca of the Federation: the English language. The ‘English’ letters
O-R-A-N-G-E took up more space than all the ideographs combined” (McDonnell 346).
Not only does this imagery evoke the crowding out of native culture by an invading
outsider, but it also hints at the fact that English, and verbal speech in general, is not the
most effective mode of communication in this environment. In fact, it is mentioned in
passing that the Earthers are working on a way to permanently alter the dense atmosphere
of the planet to make communication more comfortable for hearing people. An Earther
tells Mist, “Your towns are very loud, you know… Maybe that’s why you people ended
up with atrophied eardrums and vocal cords” (365). There are two loaded parts of this
statement, one being the use of the word “atrophied” to describe the advantageous
adaptation developed by the population of this planet. The other is “you people,” a phrase
that implies and reinforces a power imbalance. The sentiment here is that there is
something wrong with this population and their environment, and the Earthers will
graciously “fix” these problems. A passerby at the beginning of the story says, “Not
content with fixing our ‘problem,’ now they say they’re ‘fixing’ our air. As if anything
was ever wrong with it” (McDonnell 346). Unlike the deaf population residing in our
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world, the inhabitants of this planet are living in a society that is designed not only to
accommodate them, but is constructed in celebration of their deafness. Instead of
traditional music, their festivals have light shows that people dance in sync with (361).
Likewise, instead of yelling for someone’s attention, it is custom to flash a light at a
person to signal them (358). Their hand gestures have “accents” in the same way that
spoken language does (360). Indeed, there is nothing wrong with their air; it causes no
issues among the residents of the planet. But the Earthers are more willing to change the
atmosphere of an entire planet, which arguably takes more effort, than they are willing to
bend to the predominant language of that planet.
The implants are more commonly placed in adolescents and children, which
parallels the convention of a foreign language’s enforcement in colonial schools. Author
and academic Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, who was raised in Kenya when it was a British colony,
reflected that while his native language connected those in his community, the English he
had to learn in school was used to dominate “the mental universe of the colonized” (442).
The English language was reinforced as the “civilized” counterpart to their “barbaric”
Kenyan languages. There was no future outside of peasantry if one could not master
English, which is why Thiong’o credits the peasant class for preserving the wide varieties
of languages in Kenya and Africa generally (447). Likewise, in the culture depicted in
McDonnell’s story, community is of critical importance. Extended families live together
on a compound, which totals to 98 people in Mist’s family. When all of Mist’s young
nieces and nephews get implants, they begin communicating in ways that are inaccessible
to their deaf family members. Mist reflects that “all they did was mouth-talk among
themselves, indulging in ‘sounds’ which the rest could neither hear nor understand’
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(McDonnell 347). Language is, at its core, a social technology. By using a language that
excludes their elders, the most knowledgeable and valuable people within their culture
are isolated from their children and grandchildren.
Ultimately, Flowers-in-the-Sun, Mist’s adolescent daughter, chooses to receive
implants for two valid reasons: belonging and economic security. As mentioned, her
cousins primarily use mouth-to-ear communication, which isolates her. “Already she is
alone,” her father Ion says, “even among her cousins” (McDonnell 351). There’s an
impossible decision to make here; their culture as they know it is on the line due to these
implants, but without implants they could lose connection with others in their community
entirely. Flowers-in-the-Sun also plans to pursue an inter-caste career in science and
trade, which would be hard to achieve without meeting the communication preferences of
those she trades with: the Earthers. “I will show the Earth traders that we know how to
measure the purity of foods, that we are more than receivers of their tainted money,”
Flowers-in-the-Sun says, implying an effort to weaponize mouth-to-ear English to prove
her people worthy of respect (McDonnell 357). The notion of using the language of the
colonizer in this way is contentious. Thiong'o, for instance, stopped publishing his novels
in English in favor of the Gikuyu language of Kenya’s Kikuyu people. Thiong'o writes,
“Language carries culture, and culture carries… the entire body of values by which we
come to perceive ourselves and our place in the world” (441). On the other hand, Nalo
Hopkinson reflects on Audre Lorde’s statement that “the master’s tools will never
dismantle the master’s house,” in the introduction of So Long Been Dreaming, writing,
“In my hands, massa’s tools don’t dismantle massa’s house—and in fact, I don’t want to
destroy it so much as I want to undertake massive renovations—they build me a house of
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my own” (Hopkinson 16). Hopkinson aligns with Flowers-in-the-Sun in this sentiment,
as Flowers-in-the-Sun seeks to use the language of the Earthers to enact change and
generate upward social mobility for herself and her family.
However, the impact that these implants have on Flowers-in-the-Sun’s ability to
interact with her culture implies that Thing’o’s assertion that language carries culture is
true. The story concludes with Mist imploring Flowers-in-the-Sun to attend the annual
Mother-Infant festival. She begrudgingly agrees, complaining that “It’s very loud …
Everywhere. It hurts my ears. We are a very loud people” (McDonnell 370). The native
people are undergoing a procedure that forces them to experience these cultural events
from the perspective of an outsider. Flowers-in-the-Sun never considered her people loud
until the English language shifts her subjectivity. Participation in these cultural traditions
is excruciating for the implanted people, which parallels Thiong’o’s memory of children
being cracked with canes if they were heard speaking Gikuyu (438). Although the
Earthers aren’t directly inflicting pain upon the native people, the effect is the same:
engaging with one’s own culture results in pain. When they arrive at the festival, Mist
discovers that she’s not the only parent who is struggling in the wake of their child’s
implantation: “In fact, the mothers all seemed lost, forgotten, childless as they stood on
the edge of the road, their backs against the high walls of the cliff. Their lost eyes
watched dejectedly as their children chattered on in animated mouth-talk with other
children” (371). Children are a living representation of the future. If the implanted youth
of this community are no longer interested in participating in the practices that construct
their culture or fostering connections with those who don’t have implants, then the
culture is as good as dead.
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The story’s treatment of prostheses reflects not only on colonialism, but on
disability in contemporary society. The ethics of placing cochlear implants in infants and
young children has been a point of contention within and without the Deaf2 community
for decades. The viral videos of babies hearing the voices of their parents for the first
time would have hearing people believe that cochlear implants are a cure for deafness,
thus rendering sign language unnecessary. Carol A. Padden writes that “in some hospitals
sign language is not compatible with post-operative treatment” (512). After all, the
cochlear implant is intended to allow the child to hear, so why would they need to
communicate in any other way? Sara Novic, a deaf writer and professor, asserts that sign
language is not incompatible with audible speech, and that it’s dangerous for hearing
parents to have this impression when consenting to their child’s surgery. Not all deaf
people are eligible for a cochlear implant to begin with, but even those who are eligible
face a long, difficult road to acquiring spoken language. The electric impulses produced
by the implant may register as sound in the brain, but it certainly doesn’t register as
language instantaneously. Thus, Novic argues that it is important for deaf children with
implants to be raised with ASL as their primary language and framework from which to
acquire other languages, like spoken-word English. Novic writes, “A cochlear implant
isn’t inherently bad, but it isn’t inherently good, either; it is a neutral piece of technology,
a tool, like a hammer” (Novic). Arguing that an entire type of prosthetic is intrinsically
bad is as fallacious as arguing that the entire human species is intrinsically good.

The National Association of the Deaf affirms Carol Padden and Tom Humphries’s statement
regarding the difference between deaf and Deaf in the introduction to the 1988 book Deaf in
America: Voices from a Culture. The lowercase deaf, they write, refers to “the audiological
condition of not hearing” while the uppercase Deaf refers to a cultural group who “have inherited
their sign language, use it as a primary means of communication among themselves, and hold to a
set of beliefs about themselves and their connection to the larger society” (II).
2
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Cochlear implants, like people, respond to and interact with their environment, which
greatly impacts their efficacy or their harm. If a child with cochlear implants doesn’t
respond well to spoken language—or if that child seeks solidarity with deaf peers without
implants—the inability to sign poses significant challenges.
In addition to the pragmatic reasons for being wary of the cochlear implant as a
cure, some argue that the use of cochlear implants as a replacement for sign language
risks a cultural loss in the Deaf community in a way that parallels “Lingua Franca.” By
the time implants were being regularly installed in the 1990s, a vibrant Deaf culture was
established, spearheading the idea that deafness was not a disability, but a difference. A
recent short film by Deaf activist Chella Man captures this concept well. It depicts three
Deaf people underwater, signing about the strengths that arise from deafness. They say,
“We are often told we have lost, we have a loss, we are at a loss. To an extent, this is true.
But, through this loss, there is great gain. Perhaps even such a gain that we forget about
loss” (Man). After all, these individuals are capable of complex communication while
submerged underwater, an ability that only those fluent in sign language can accomplish.
Padden writes that throughout the late 20th century, deaf people have “acquired not only a
new vocabulary but also a new consciousness, indeed a self-consciousness about
themselves and their behaviors” (509). Similarly, Thiong’o argues that Kenyan children
should learn and be immersed in their native language as a first language before acquiring
others. He writes that with a starting point in his native language, “he can learn other
languages and even enjoy the positive humanistic, democratic and revolutionary elements
in other people’s languages and cultures without any complexes about his own language,
his own self, his environment” (452). This notion is quite similar to that of Novic, who
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argues that deaf children should learn ASL as a first language even if they have implants.
As is demonstrated in “Lingua Franca,” language plays a pivotal role in constructing
culture, which makes its preservation crucial.
In the case of McDonnell’s short story, learning sign language as a primary
language wouldn’t be enough to sustain their culture, as their implants are incompatible
with their native environment and traditions. The Earthers have developed and
encouraged the use of prosthetics that sacrifice the comfort of the natives to make the
colonizer more comfortable in a foreign land. Unlike the precedent of using prosthetics to
make an inaccessible society more accessible to those who want it, the deaf inhabitants of
the unnamed planet thrive in an environment that makes hearing a disadvantage. What is
considered a disability to the foreign Earthers is an evolutionary advantage to the native
people. In a sense, McDonnell has constructed an example of a compelling argument
against the elimination of disabilities through genetic engineering: we simply don’t know
how our habitat may change in hundreds or thousands of years. Genetic diversity is what
allows species to appropriately adapt to their environment over time. If that diversity is
purposefully limited, valuable cultures are eradicated and the future of the Homo sapiens
is threatened.
III. “Jon”
In “Jon,” George Saunders speculates, much like McDonnell, that brain implants
could cause immense changes in how language is created and internalized. While
McDonnell’s narrative approaches the ethics of technological implants used to foster
colonialism and ableism, Saunders uses brain implants to offer a similar conjecture about
how such a device could be used to drive consumerism. His characters think and speak in
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a vastly different way to that of the reader, and the eponymous protagonist comes to
recognize his skewed priorities and his lack of embodied, non-commodified experiences
by the novel’s conclusion.
Saunders critiques consumerism through the depiction of a marketing facility that
purchases infants from the many impoverished parents in America, implants data chips
(“gargadisks”) that contain millions of commercials in their brains, and employs the
children as product testers. These children never leave the confines of their facility but
are made into celebrities nonetheless, with outside children collecting their images on
trading cards and gathering outside in hopes of catching a glimpse of any one of them.
When Jon’s partner Carolyn becomes pregnant, she becomes determined to leave the
facility. The first child that was born in the facility, Baby Amber, mysteriously and
suddenly dies, which sparks Carolyn’s desire to find a more hospitable and independent
environment to raise her baby in. Leaving the facility requires the removal of the
gargadisk. A significant side effect to this surgery is a loss of language that is typically
temporary, but could lead to permanent damage. Jon is deeply anxious about this
prospect, as he has learned that his mind is the only valuable part of his body. His mind,
in partnership with the gargadisk, is the most important part of his work analyzing
products and writing feedback. The unchanging environment of the marketing facility
also serves to deprive the senses of those that inhabit it, thus encouraging the favoritism
of the mind over the body. Jon ultimately realizes that his embodied, sensory experiences
outside of the facility with Carolyn are far more vivid and rewarding than the detached,
cerebral monotony he was used to, which is what drives him to abandon the only life and
meaning he knows.
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Saunders specifically satirizes the role that marketing and advertising plays in
American culture through the use of advertisements as referents. Consider the Superbowl,
which is consistently the most watched broadcast in America year after year. The
advertisements for the game are a cultural touchstone in-and-of themselves, with a
National Retail Federation study reporting that 17.7% of Superbowl viewers say that the
commercials are the most important part of the Superbowl experience (“An Estimated”).
This represents tens of millions of people tuning into a 4-hour broadcast primarily to
consume advertisements. Given these statistics, in “Jon,” Coordinator Slippen is
validated in his assertion that commercials are “an unforgettable testimony to who we are
as a nation” (Saunders). Commercials give Americans shared experiences. Superbowl
commercials in particular can spark conversations with near strangers around office water
fountains. They provide the means to convey meaning in a way that is virtually
guaranteed to be understood. Inherently, having these shared understandings of phrases
or images is a good thing. It makes communication and connection easier. However, it’s
impossible to ignore the fact that commercials are specifically designed to sell products
and manipulate human emotions to make a company memorable. There is a monetary
motive in creating content that people reference in their daily lives, as it creates strong
associations with products that aren’t possible simply by seeing it in a grocery store. The
gargadisk in the story “Jon,” like most prosthetics, isn't inherently a bad piece of
technology. Having a database stored in one's head could be an incredibly useful tool in a
wide variety of ways. Utilizing this technology with endless potential to store thousands
of advertisements in the minds of marketing guinea pigs is what makes this technological
future so disconcerting.
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Like McDonnell, Saunders is also concerned with how prosthetic devices can
impact language, particularly on the level of semiotics. Given that the teenagers in this
facility were implanted with the gargadisks at a formative age and confined within the
walls of the facility, the only referents they can use to create meaning come from the
advertisements stored inside of their brains. Jon’s narration in this story is surreal and
often amusing in this sense: his recollection of events is peppered with similes involving
coded advertisements. For instance, Jon’s description of a pensive moment between
himself and Carolyn involves a comparison to “Colonel Sanders and wife at LI 87345,
where he is in jail for refusing to give up the recipe for KFC Haitian MiniBreasts”
(Saunders). This narration only emphasizes how monumental it is to lose these referents
upon the removal of the gargadisk. One man, a year after his chip was removed, tells Jon
and Carolyn, “There are, if you will, places where things used to be when I went looking
for them, brainwise, but now, when I go there, nothing is there, it is like I have the
shelving but not the cans of corn, if you get my drift” (Saunders). The signifiers that give
form to language remain when the advertising chip is removed because speech is still
acquired independently in the brain. Those who undergo the procedure speak in
nonsensical sentence fragments, which indicates that the actual sounds that constitute
words remain in the brain. But the only signifieds that can be accessed by these people
are housed in the gargadisk. Once those are gone, they have no way to make meaning
until they gain new referents. Jon seems to be aware of this before ever meeting people
who have experienced this phenomenon. When Carolyn hints at leaving the facility, Jon
expresses his concerns about how he will convey his feelings for her once their
gargadisks are removed. He says,
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If I want to say to Carolyn, Carolyn, LI 34451, check it out, that is how I feel
about you—well, then, I want to say it! I want to possess all the articulate I can,
because otherwise… I will turn to her and say, Honey, uh, honey, there is a
certain feeling but I cannot name it and cannot cite a precedent-type feeling, but
trust me, dearest, wow, do I ever feel it for you, right now. (Saunders)
Conveying meaning, it seems, is simpler with a gargadisk than without. With a
standardized code, Carolyn can access the exact same piece of media that Jon is using to
build a metaphor. Without this shared base of understanding, they would have to
reconstruct the meaning of language from a clean slate.
Jon has two names in this story—Jon and Randy—that respectively represent his
authentic, embodied identity and his disembodied, cerebral role in the marketing facility.
Early in the story, it is established that Carolyn refers to Jon as such, but the Coordinators
of the facility call him Randy. Jon explains, “Because by the way my name is really Jon.
Randy is just what my mother put on the form the day I was Accepted, although to tell
the truth I do not know why” (Saunders). It soon becomes clear that the marketing facility
changed his name, a symbolic redirection of his supposed fate. When he considers
leaving the facility, the coordinators show him footage taken of his mother when she sold
him to the facility to dissuade him from entering the impoverished world. Coordinator
Delacourt tells Jon, “So much in us is hardwired! You cannot fight fate without some
significant help from an intervening entity, such as us, such as our resources, which we
have poured into you in good faith all these years” (Saunders). The marketing facility
ultimately views the prospect of Jon leaving as a sunk cost and waste of resources. The
facility values Jon for his intellectual work in conjunction with the gargadisk, which
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mitigates the money it costs to feed, house, and clothe the body that is useless to them.
Additionally, the implication that poverty is hardwired into Jon at a fundamental level
epitomizes social Darwinism, and Delacourt articulates this when he says, “You are a
prince, we have made you a prince. Please do not descend back into the mud” (Saunders).
The Coordinators seem to believe that they are doing philanthropic work, valiantly
defying the harsh competition inherent to society. Interestingly, it is never explained how
Jon knows his name is Jon, as he is an infant in the video of his mother speaking to the
marketing facility. His knowledge of his birth name could be an indication that his
identity is, somehow, “hardwired” in the way that Delacourt suggests. Alternatively, his
identity as Jon could have been constructed by his own subjective experiences, meaning
that he gave himself the name Jon in order to differentiate his authentic self from his role
in the marketing facility. When he wavers between leaving with Carolyn and his unborn
child and staying, the Coordinators regularly call him both Jon and Randy: “Jon, Randy,
whoever;” “Randy, Jon, whatever you are calling yourself these days” (Saunders). When
they try to convince him to stay, they repeat the name Randy throughout their pleas. It
seems that Jon refers to his embodied, worldly experiences while Randy is the
disembodied mind that labors for the marketing facility.
Jon’s pivotal revelation comes the first time he is exposed to the outside world,
which widens his perspective of his own identity and his fear of losing language. The
sentimental Coordinator Slippen covertly organizes a rendezvous between Jon and postgargadisk-removal Carolyn, which necessitates removing Jon from the only environment
he has ever known. Jon describes the feeling of being outside as “powerful” and lays on
his stomach studying the details of the flowers and blades of grass that he has never
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experienced with all of his senses (Saunders). Jon is so moved by this fleeting moment
that he says, “If I live one million years I will never forget all the beautiful things I saw
and experienced in that kickass outside yard” (Saunders). Prior to this, Jon’s perspective
of the world was limited to the events inside the walls of the marketing facility and the
database of advertisements in his head. Given the plain, unchanging environment he
resides in and being solely valued for his intelligence and productivity, Jon naturally
privileges his brain over his body. For his entire life, his brain has been the only part of
his body that has worth and provides meaning and context to his experiences. On the
other hand, his embodied observation of the grass and flowers, which he was only
familiar with as images supplied by the gargadisk, makes his implanted, commercial
experiences seem dulled in comparison. And when he lays eyes on Carolyn for the first
time, his first thoughts critiquing her lack of makeup and hair products reflect the
superficiality that has been fed to him throughout his lifetime. These thoughts represent
Jon’s identity as Randy, the carefully curated marketing asset. Carolyn primarily speaks
in jumbled chunks of commercials, but ultimately says Jon’s name: “Not my name of
Randy but my real name of Jon” (Saunders). He remarks that despite the hole in
Carolyn’s neck from her surgery and her plain appearance, “still she looked so pretty, it
was like someone had put a light inside her and switched it on” (Saunders). He sees
beyond the surface-level of her appearance, sensing the fulfillment and joy that have been
worth Carolyn’s loss of language and sheltered life. He suddenly understands that his
identity as Jon is embodied in a way that Randy can never be. Randy was reduced to a
tool in a corporate arsenal, defined by his prosthesis, but was complacent for years due to
his hedonism and fear of the outside world. On the contrary, the name Jon carries a sense
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of authenticity that Randy doesn’t, which parallels Jon’s growth from materialism to
sincerity.
Jon ultimately chooses to remove his gargadisk to join Carolyn and their unborn
child in the world beyond the marketing facility, despite his fear of losing the content that
gives language meaning. He hopes that he and Carolyn will someday be able to look at
the stars and the moon without the need to compare them to an advertisement. Jon says,
“In terms of what we will think of, I do not know … but to tell the truth I am curious, I
think I am ready to try” (Saunders). Jon understands that his current subjectivity is
extremely limited and optimized for corporate interests. After his first in-depth sensory
experience, Jon is then able to dismantle the hierarchy that favors his mind over his body.
This favoritism was so powerful that for most of the narrative, he was willing to abandon
his girlfriend and unborn child to preserve the integrity of his cognition. Saunders’
deconstruction of the mind-body dualism communicates the posthuman sentiment that
embodiment deeply influences the mind.
IV. Conclusion
One of the shared ways that these three stories emphasize the exploitation of
technological prosthetics is through the physical manipulation of children. Children are
one of the least controversial groups of people to defend. Consider the cliché “Save the
Children” slogans attributed to various social and political movements. Children are
innocent and defenseless, which makes them easily manipulated and exploited. In “The
Black Box,” this is invoked through the normalization of performing invasive, elective
surgery on children who are far too young to understand or consent to it. “Lingua Franca”
is told through the perspective of a mother who is ferociously protective of her teenage
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daughter but is unable to sway her daughter’s decision to be implanted. “Jon” is unique in
that the parents of the children in the facility are absent from the story. The closest to a
father figure that Jon and Carolyn have is Coordinator Slippen, the man who exposes Jon
to the outside world and whom Jon calls “the father I never had” (Saunders). The absence
of these parental figures is the disturbing aspect of this story: these parents were so
financially drained that they sold their children to a marketing facility to be operated on
and employed from a tender age. These stories could be advocating for parents to remain
well-informed about the technology their children have access to, and this is certainly a
relevant message. That being said, the parents in these stories were largely powerless
against the larger forces that brought about the use of these prosthetics in the first place.
The parents in Older’s story are motivated by competition and conformity, the mother of
McDonnell’s story has no input in her daughter’s capitulation to the forces of
colonialism, and the parents of Saunders’s story are in such dire economic conditions that
they are willing to sell their child to give them a better life. The hierarchical divides and
hegemony lurking below the surface are the things the reader should be aware of.
Despite the ethically compromised uses of technological prosthetics in these
narratives, it’s important to remember that, like many depictions of cyborgs in science
fiction, the technology isn’t the enemy, but the intent behind its use is. In the case of “The
Black Box,” however, it isn’t implied that the Lifebrarian is being used in harmful ways.
Certainly one can use one's imagination to come up with ways that this technology can be
exploited, particularly in terms of archives and what is done with the information stored
in the Lifebrarian after the death of the owner. The end of the story notes that a 10-year
anniversary of the catastrophic earthquake that killed Sumi featured footage recovered
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from bodies in the wreckage. This is certainly a more invasive form of the already
uncomfortable details featured in memorials and museums: final phone calls, bloodied tshirts. However, the problematic aspect of this story doesn’t involve manipulation like
the other two stories. Instead, it’s more about the urge to implement seemingly useful
technological developments without considering the possible impacts or flaws it could
have. The device in “The Black Box” simply has to be present to spark ethical dilemmas
and existential crises, it doesn’t have to do anything outright nefarious. The ethics of
opting into elective surgery for a person who cannot consent is an issue in and of itself.
But when that elective surgery implants a device that is intended to record every waking
moment of one's life, it is particularly important for the recipient to consent or at least
have the option to remove it later in life. In “Lingua Franca,” although Flowers-in-theSun consents to her surgery, she is ultimately presented with limited choices. She is
intending to enter trade, which involves communication with a group of people who are
unwilling to bend to her cultural norms or language. This is a notion that is familiar to
many groups of people who have been subjected to colonialism. It also evokes the
lengths that deaf people will go to in order to accommodate mouth-to-ear language,
including lip-reading or cochlear implants. The availability of technology like that seen in
“Lingua Franca” could be an incredible asset to many people outside of the
circumstances that it is used in. Likewise, the mental databases depicted in “Jon” could
have been utilized in any number of ways. Instead, it is wasted on creating living,
breathing advertisements and product professionals. The technology is presumably
invented and patented by this marketing company, so it is unlikely to be used for
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anything else. The conflict in these stories lies not in the technology itself. The conflict
lies in their use without consent or their use for exploitative ends.
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Chapter 3: Body Swapping
In science fiction television ranging from Star Trek to Futurama, body swapping
is used as a single-episode gag that is easily reversed without long-term consequences or
significance. It is rarely a central feature of a narrative, and it’s even more rare that the
implications of this technology are explored in depth. But removing the minds of two
people and trading them is a literal depiction of Cartesian dualism, a significant and
polarizing philosophical concept that concerns posthumanist and humanist theory alike.
The narratives I focus on in this chapter explore the complications that arise when
separating the mind and body.
The conception of the mind and body as distinct entities extends back to Plato,
who, according to George Dicker, “conceived of the soul as an immaterial entity that
outlives the body” (83). Dicker writes that René Descartes updated Plato in his
conception of Cartesian dualism (or mind–body dualism) in Meditations on First
Philosophy, a treatise originally published in 1641. As I discussed in the introduction,
mind–body dualism simultaneously laid “the modern philosophical underpinnings for the
Judeo-Christian view of human beings,” while employing the logic and reasoning to
present it in an acceptable form to scientific minds of the Enlightenment (Dicker 83). In
short, Meditations is, above all else, motivated by doubt. Descartes sought to discover
“what, if anything, is absolutely certain,” which he accomplished by examining all of his
most deeply held beliefs (Dicker 10). He realized that all that he thinks he knows is
attained through his bodily senses, which he deems unreliable using a few hypotheticals.
His sensory experiences could be a realistic dream, and the images and knowledge that
inform this dream were provided by God when he was created, pre-installed like the
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stock photos on a new computer (Dicker 19; 22). Or, indeed, a demon could be deceiving
him about the existence of the entire physical world, including his own body (Dicker 26).
Descartes comes to the famous conclusion that his ability to doubt the existence of his
own consciousness is proof that he, in fact, must have a consciousness with which to
doubt: Cogito, ergo sum, or I think, therefore I am.
Although Cartesian dualism is considered, in the words of Gilbert Ryle, “the
official doctrine” of modern philosophy (1), it generated what is referred to as the mind–
body problem. Cartesian dualism asserts that although the substance of the mind and the
substance of the body are ontologically different, they have an interactive relationship in
which they have a mutual causal effect on one another. For instance, imagining sad
thoughts in the immaterial mind can cause the material eyes to begin tearing up. The
mind–body problem arises from this proposed relationship: can a non-physical object like
the mind have a physical effect on a physical object like the body, and how?
As noted earlier, the Cartesian mind–body problem has been a source of tension
between and within humanism and posthumanism alike, with proponents of both
movements falling on either side of the argument. Modern secular humanists, for
instance, mostly deny Cartesian dualism on the basis of scientific rationality. Curliss
Lamont refers to Cartesian dualism as “supernaturalist metaphysics” that supports a sense
of spirituality that is rejected by secular humanists (143). But the remnants of
Enlightenment humanism’s embrace of Cartesian dualism can still be detected within
secular humanism regardless. Secular humanists affirm (knowingly or otherwise) human
exceptionalism, a notion defended primarily using traits of not the body, but the human
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mind. Perez Zagorin, a humanist scholar, writes that human exceptionalism is justified by
a series of “unquestionable” facts:
Humans are by a long way the most intelligent creatures who inhabit the Earth
and possibly also, so far as we know at present in our search for extraterrestrial
life, the most intelligent beings who exist in the universe. They are also the only
one of nature's creations on Earth who have fashioned progressive moral codes
ordaining love, care, compassion, and concern for their fellow creatures and other
living things. (91)
These facts aren’t related to physical, human traits like opposable thumbs. Instead,
Zagorin posits that the mind is the primary substance that differentiates the human animal
from the non-human animal.
Like humanists, posthumanists also disagree on the mind–body problem, which
can be roughly distinguished between the pro-dualism transhumanists and anti-dualism
critical posthumanists. Transhumanism is an interdisciplinary movement that specifically
advocates for the enhancement of the human through technological posthumanism. The
relationship between posthumanism and transhumanism, much like that of posthumanism
and humanism, is hard to define. However, I posit that the mind–body problem is the
single largest difference between the two similar movements. I will use the work of
prominent transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom and critical posthumanist N.
Katherine Hayles to illustrate this.
Transhumanist Nick Bostrom is well-known for popularizing the ancestorsimulation hypothesis, which is uncannily like the hypothetical examples Descartes
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presents to prove that the bodily senses cannot be trusted. Bostrom proposed that one of
three relatively unlikely circumstances must be true:
(1) the human species is very likely to become extinct before reaching a
'posthuman' stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a
significant number of simulations of its evolutionary history (or variations
thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. (“Are” 233)
Our entire experience of reality, Bostrom posits, could be a fabricated, Sims-esque virtual
reality created by our distant descendants to gain insight into how their ancestors may
have lived. Bostrom goes on to reflect that the posthumans who have theoretically
constructed this simulation are like gods in comparison to us in terms of their
omniscience and omnipotence. It is no coincidence that Bostrom—who advocates for
what Cary Wolfe describes as “an intensification of humanism”—formulated a set of
circumstances remarkably similar to the demonic deception posited by Descartes, a
philosopher who foregrounded the human exceptionalism at the heart of humanism (xv).
In both cases, one’s own consciousness is all that is absolutely certain, and the senses
based in the body aren’t trustworthy.
However, as implied in the concept of an ancestor simulation, Bostrom posits that
in principle, uploading a thoroughly rendered brain scan to a powerful computer would
successfully transfer an unaltered consciousness. This notion, scientifically, originates
from cyberneticist Norman Wiener, who proposed that it could be possible to telegraph a
human consciousness (Hayles 1). Roboticist Hans Moravec rendered this possibility in
terms of computer uploads in 1988, and Bostrom seems to have carried his torch into the
modern day. Bostrom writes, “For the continuation of personhood, on this view, it
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matters little whether you are implemented on a silicon chip inside a computer or in that
gray, cheesy lump inside your skull, assuming both implementations are conscious”
(“The Transhumanist FAQ” 17-18). As has been established in the AI chapter, what
defines a person doesn’t lie in the circumstances of creation or substrates used for that
creation. However, the question of transferring a previously established consciousness
from one substrate to another raises questions not about whether the consciousness
remains a person, but whether they remain the same person they were prior to this
transfer.
Unlike transhumanism’s embrace of mind-body dualism, posthumanists remain
skeptical, even if they acknowledge that the mind’s information could physically be
removed from its embodiment. Although his work predates posthumanism, Gilbert Ryle
famously critiqued Cartesian dualism as describing “the ghost in the machine,” a phrase
he uses with “deliberate abusiveness” (5). Ryle claims that the mind and the body are not
comparable substances as posed by Descartes. Instead, the mind is a description of the
way the body is organized rather than an additional, unseen part of the body. Ryle writes,
“The belief that there is a polar opposition between Mind and Matter is the belief that
they are terms of the same logical type” (12). Ryle illustrates that this belief is faulty
through the hypothetical example of a person visiting Oxford for the first time. They go
on a tour that shows them all of the various colleges, administrative offices, laboratories,
and libraries that comprise Oxford. The visitor, confused, asks where the University is.
He says, “I have seen where the members of the colleges live, where the Registrar works,
where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in
which reside and work the members of your University” (Ryle 6). It goes without saying
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that the University isn’t, in fact, an additional component of Oxford, but denotes the way
that all of these components are organized and interact. Likewise, the thinking mind isn’t
an additional part of the body; it is the result of the composition and relationship between
the parts of the body.
Much like the iconic image of the ghost in the machine carried into science
fiction, Ryle’s emphasis on embodiment is something that carries into the critical
posthumanist view of how the mind and body intersect. Where the circumstances of
embodiment are irrelevant to transhumanist Bostrom, they are incredibly important to a
posthumanist scholar like Hayles, who writes that “embodiment makes clear that thought
is a much broader cognitive function depending for its specificities on the embodied form
enacting it” (xiv). Instead, embodiment and subjectivity are infinitely influential to
Hayles’s posthuman subject, with the liberal humanist subject coming into question
primarily due to the myth of autonomy, a notion that is preserved in Bostrom’s fantastical
digitized consciousness. The mind, to Hayles and Ryle alike, is closer to a verb than a
noun. The thinking mind is the process that results from the interactions between physical
parts of the human body and the environment surrounding that body, not an additional,
metaphysical entity.
Mind–body dualism is particularly pertinent to the science fiction novel and short
stories that are the focus of this chapter because they involve body swapping, in which
the consciousness is removed from its original body and re-embodied in an alternative
one. On the one hand, mind–body dualism is reified in these narratives, as the
consciousness can and is severed from the body it originated from. On the other hand, the
overarching theme of these narratives is that even when body swapping is presented as a
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procedure as straightforward as Bostrom’s brain-to-computer upload, embodiment
remains an important aspect of subjectivity. This critique of dualism aligns with
Hayles’s: although the information that constitutes consciousness can be removed from
its organic substrate, the substrate remains a crucial factor in the construction of that
consciousness. Richard K. Morgan’s 2002 novel Altered Carbon depicts a transhumanist
daydream of preserving the consciousness beyond death through the presence of a
cortical stack, a small hard drive located at the base of the brain. However, the
experiences of the main character, who has been embodied in countless bodies over many
years, suggest that the transfer of consciousness from body-to-body doesn’t leave it
unaffected. Likewise, Calvin Gimpelevich’s 2017 short story “Rent, Don’t Sell” deals
with the memories held within the body, even if the consciousness inside of it changes.
The main character, a disabled Marine veteran, yearns for a new body to replace her
missing limb. Body-swapping, however, is a privilege typically reserved for those who
can afford it. Her encounter with a trans woman—who regrets ceding her original body in
search of a solution to her gender dysphoria—radically alters her perception of the body’s
relationship with the mind. Finally, “The Girl Who Was Plugged In” by James Tiptree Jr.
(1973) addresses the manipulation that occurs when body-swapping is motivated by
capital gains. The consciousness of a vulnerable teenage girl is used by a corporation as
the remote brain of a genetically engineered woman, created to promote products. The
narrative explores the codependency the girl forms with her new body and criticizes
science fiction readers and writers for prioritizing fantastical technological advancements
over empathy for the characters in the text. All of these narratives appropriate this
whimsical science fiction technology to convey a certain cynicism about the anticipated
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effects of that technology, particularly as it’s used to reinforce class divisions and fortify
gender dichotomies.
I. Altered Carbon
The term cyberpunk describes a subgenre of science fiction that is characterized
by a decaying yet futuristic urban setting and a brooding, outcast protagonist. Society is
often organized into stratified class hierarchies, so the suffix -punk suggests a resistance
to an overarching antagonistic force that is oligarchic and/or fascist. Bruce Sterling wrote,
simply, that cyberpunk depicts “lowlife and high tech” (13). Richard K. Morgan’s 2002
novel Altered Carbon is the most archetypal example of cyberpunk literature in this
chapter, because of its cynical representation of the perverse nature of late capitalism.
However, while Heather Hicks writes that major cyberpunk authors tend to “privilege
disembodiment over embodiment” (64), Morgan’s novel leans in the opposite direction.
The novelty and seemingly positive aspects of body swapping in the setting of Altered
Carbon are tainted by the ways that it has shifted human subjectivity and reinforced class
hierarchies.
Altered Carbon is set over 300 years in the future, and the human race has
colonized multiple extragalactic planets using a revolutionary technology that condenses
the human consciousness into pure information to be sent thousands of light years away
with extreme efficiency. This leads to the presence of “cortical stacks,” hard drives
situated at the back of the neck that are used to store the entirety of that person’s
consciousness. Bodies, to those privileged enough, are seen as a furnishing and referred
to colloquially as “sleeves.” Hayles writes that her nightmare is “a culture inhabited by
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posthumans who regard their bodies as fashion accessories rather than the grounds of
being” (5), which seems to have come to fruition in this narrative’s universe.
In terms of shedding the importance of embodiment and materiality, the premise
of Altered Carbon enacts all of the advantages to uploadable consciousness as detailed by
transhumanist Bostrom. Death is only permanent if the cortical stack is destroyed.
Cortical stacks can be inserted into a virtual reality, which facilitates life without a body.
Bostrom even writes, uncannily, “You could travel at the speed of light as an information
pattern, which could be convenient in a future age of large-scale space settlements” (“The
Transhumanist FAQ” 18). Despite this exciting scientific future, Morgan expresses
skepticism toward Bostrom’s aspirations. In this novel, only the wealthy have access to
these advantages, such as automatic back-ups of cortical stacks to ensure immortality and
even the privilege of resleeving in general. In addition to this, the psyches of those who
stay alive for centuries or regularly swap bodies are dramatically altered, often for the
worse. Body-swapping is characterized as a potentially traumatic experience for the
unprepared.
The “Meths,” a class of absurdly wealthy oligarchs, develop a warped sense of
morals because of their extended lifespans and frequent resleeving. Meths are, for all
intents and purposes, immortal, which is reflected in the slang term that refers to them;
Meth is short for Methuselah, the 969-year-old figure of the Abrahamic religions.
Laurens Bancroft, a Meth that strongarms protagonist Takeshi Kovacs to solve his
murder, hasn’t quite reached Methuselah’s age, but he is over 300 years old. “Rich
people do this,” Kovacs says regarding his new, unwanted role as a private investigator,
“They have the power and they see no reason not to use it. Men and women are just
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merchandise, like everything else. Store, them, freight them, decant them. Sign at the
bottom, please” (34). The stereotyping of Meths as exploitative and callous is echoed
throughout the narrative. The local police chief, Kristen Ortega, says of Meths:
Suddenly the little people, thirty, maybe forty years old, well, they don’t really
matter anymore. You’ve seen whole societies rise and fall, and you start to feel
you’re standing outside of it all … They’re like the A.I.s. They’re a breed apart.
They’re not human. They deal with humanity the way you and I deal with insect
life. (71)
The characterization of the Meths as “not human” and, likewise, the perspective that the
“little people” are as insignificant as insects to them goes to show how the devaluation of
the non-human can be applied to undesirable groups of people.
Morgan shows that the stereotype that Meths don’t value life is largely true,
which offers a critique of the immortality idealized by transhumanists. There are three
Meths present in the narrative: Laurens Bancroft, his wife Miriam Bancroft, and Reileen
Kawahara, a mob boss who is very familiar with Kovacs. Ultimately, Miriam and Reileen
are responsible for Laurens’s death, as they drugged him in retaliation for refusing to
cover up a murder at Reileen’s brothel. Reileen says that when she told him about the
murder, she “hardly expected him to side with the little people,” reiterating the belittling
language Ortega used to describe the Meths’ perception of others (455). In a drug-fueled
rage, Laurens murders a sex worker and kills himself to erase the memory of it. In her
final moments, Reileen tells Kovacs, “You are still young and stupid. Human life has no
value. Haven’t you learned that yet, Takeshi, with all you’ve seen? … You can always
get some more people. They reproduce like cancer cells, whether you want them or not”
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(455-6). The Meths, the most powerful people in this society, have no regard for the lives
of those beneath them because, presumably, they’ve lived too long, seen too much, and
have nothing to lose.
The protagonist, Takeshi Kovacs, is like the Meths in that he is well-adjusted to
re-sleeving, but he has been trained to avoid feelings of personal ownership of his body.
Laurens Bancroft awakens in clones of his own body, but Kovacs doesn’t have that
luxury. He is an Envoy, which is essentially an elite class of super soldiers that are
psychologically trained to quickly adapt to new sleeves. This training allows them to
acclimate quickly to foreign sleeves and foreign lands. Kovacs says of ordinary soldiers
exposed to similar stress that, “They’re in bodies they don’t know, on a world they don’t
know, fighting for one bunch of total strangers against another bunch of total strangers …
The climate is different, the language and culture are different, the wildlife and
vegetation are different, even the gravity is different” (Morgan 36). Preparedness for
these changes, Kovacs says, can’t come from technological additions to a sleeve or a
cortical stack. The only way this preparation will transfer quickly from sleeve to sleeve is
if the consciousness within the stack is capable, in and of itself, of adjusting to those
changes. The process of resleeving, then, isn’t as simple as downloading a consciousness
that will awaken, unchanged.
Without the training that Kovacs received, ordinary citizens often develop an
ownership over their own body that makes resleeving deeply traumatic. Kovacs has a
computer hacker named Irene Elliot taken from disembodied storage and resleeved to
help him in his investigation. However, he is unable to obtain her original body, so her
appearance changes drastically. Kovacs observes, “Out of the corner of my eye, I saw her

89
look down at the body she was wearing, as if she’d spilled something down herself”
(358). She has no recognition of her own body, an experience that is deeply troubling to
her. She tells Kovacs, “I slept with my husband, and I feel like he’s been unfaithful to
me” (358). Kovacs reflects on the myriad magazine articles and self-help manuals that
have been developed in light of this common, traumatic experience. However, he
disregards them all, saying that “the reality was pain, and right now there was nothing
anyone could do to take it away” (359). The normalization of this technological
posthumanism, the fantasy presented by the narrative that body-swapping is not only
possible, but beneficial, falls apart when consciousness and subjectivity are warped in
response to a change in embodiment.
Kovacs, through his experience with varied forms of embodiment, has developed
an understanding of how embodiment impacts consciousness that is unique among the
characters the narrative. He says, “As a child, I’d believed there was an essential person,
a sort of core personality around which the surface factors could evolve and change
without damaging the integrity of who you were … this was an error of perception
caused by the metaphors we were used to framing ourselves in” (327). His juvenile
hypothesis is reminiscent of essentialism, the conception of the human as possessing a
particular set of attributes that define it as human, often referred to as “human nature.”
However, he comes to move past this conception with time and experience, determining
that the metaphors used to understand human personality and consciousness were
incorrect in a way that evokes Ryle’s mocking label of “the ghost in the machine.” This
ghost, asserts Kovacs, doesn’t exist. Human personality is nothing more than “Form in
response to stimulus” (327). The core of who he is depends on his embodiment and
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environment. Although Kovacs is psychologically trained to avoid feelings of ownership
over his sleeves, this sentiment suggests that, to some extent, his sleeve owns and shapes
his mind.
Consequently, when Kovacs and other characters are resleeved into racially
different bodies, the shift in their own self-image and the way they are perceived can be
profoundly troublesome. Although race and racism aren’t addressed in detail, it is clear
that race holds a great deal of meaning to the individuals in the narrative. In Morgan’s
imagined world, the ability to swap bodies doesn’t dismantle the significance of race.
Kovacs, hailing from a planet that was settled by Hungarian and Japanese colonists, notes
that he feels “exiled into Caucasian flesh” and detached from the body in which he
created so many formative experiences (233). A character who was specifically trained
not to grow attached to his body still finds significance and identity in his race. Likewise,
when Kovacs waits in a resleeving facility, he sees a young Black woman and her two
Black children greeted by their patriarch, “the stooped, middle-aged white man standing
before them in tattered U.N. surplus fatigues” (279). One of his children is completely
unable to identify him, an expected result of resleeving that only adds to the distress of
the father, who “looked like he’d been crying since they dragged him out of the tank”
(279). Of course, one of the issues that comes with this sleeve is that he’s significantly
older than he was previously, which makes the sleeve usable for a shorter period of time.
If his family is unable to pay for a new sleeve when the time comes, he’ll be left on stack
indefinitely. However, the juxtaposition of his race and age with that of his family is
shocking, to say the least. Here, Morgan argues that even in a society that functions as if
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the mind and body are cleanly separate entities, the body significantly contributes to how
the mind interacts with itself and its environment.
The trauma that results from a sleeve change is either rooted in an indescribable
shift of subjectivity (“the reality was pain”) or a shift in one’s relationship to their
environment and the people in it (Morgan 359). In lieu of other explanations, the
discomfort that arises when characters are given a body of a different race seems to be
similar to the discomfort that comes with resleeving in general. Changing one’s
appearance to any extent is troubling. Sex and gender3, however, play a different role in
this text, one that suggests an essentialism that the narrative distances itself from in most
other cases. There are consistent differences between any male body and any female
body, according to the experienced narrator. Nothing to this extent is suggested about
bodies of different races, for instance. It is established that the physical parts that
compose the body are relevant to one’s experience with embodiment. But in the brief
time that Kovacs embodies a female form, the sexed parts of the body are the only
relevant parts and female embodiment is weaponized against him.
The most visceral, memorable, and impactful gendered experience in the novel is
when Kovacs is tortured and raped in a female body, a body that is ceaselessly identified
as Other. Kovacs notes that this isn’t his first time embodying a woman. He reflects, “To
a man, skin was a barrier, a protection. To a woman, it was an organ of contact. That had
its disadvantages” (Morgan 152). Morgan’s representation of this difference between

For the purposes of this thesis, “sex” is defined by the physiological attributes that are used to identify if a
newborn child is a boy or a girl. “Gender” is the social, cultural, and personal identity that is adopted and
enacted throughout one’s lifetime, which is typically indicated through gendered acts and appearances. I
want to note that neither sex nor gender exist in a binary, but given that this text doesn’t represent that
reality, I will use male/female to denote sex and man/woman to denote gender.
3
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sexed bodies could be representative of how the gender roles and gendered cultural
experiences impact one’s conception of one’s body and self, as influenced by Cartesian
dualism. Judith Butler, in an essay analyzing Simone de Beauvoir’s statement that “One
is not born, but rather becomes, a woman” (qtd. in Butler 35), describes how men are
historically associated with disembodied intellect while women (the Other) are associated
with the body. Butler writes, “By defining women as ‘Other,’ ‘men’ are able through the
shortcut of definition to dispose of their bodies, to make themselves other than their
bodies, and to make their bodies other than themselves” (44). In this case, the subjective
function of a man’s skin, as noted by Kovacs, is to protect the Cartesian ghost, or mind,
that inhabits it. The woman, on the other hand, is her physicality, so her skin functions as
a point of “contact” with others (Morgan 152). It is also worth noting that the first
physical sensation described by Kovacs when he awakens in a female body is “a dull,
bloated feeling in my guts that told me my period was due” (Morgan 159). Morgan’s
descriptions of Kovacs’s physical sensations while experiencing female embodiment
serve as an incessant reminder of the Otherness of female bodies. His hair is somehow
“lank and dirty with the onset of the period,” and the relationship between menstruation
and the cleanliness of hair is never explained. His breasts are also “swollen and tender”
(159). And ultimately, this female body is physically weaker and has a lower pain
tolerance (which, again, is because of “the menstrual cycle”) than the body Kovacs came
from (152). On the other hand, when the novel opens and Kovacs inhabits a new male
body, his descriptions of his physicality aren’t nearly as based in sex characteristics; he
has a “swimmer’s build,” “tightness in the lungs that suggested a nicotine habit,”
“scarring on the forearm” (15). Unlike the bodily details described in that moment, the
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sexed features of the female body are presented as the most fundamental components of
that body.
Morgan focuses on the sexed parts of the female body in preparation for Kovacs
to be raped, a traumatizing gendered experience that he was utterly unprepared for. When
he makes a vain attempt on first encounter to fight his torturers, one of them calls him—
in an overbearingly gendered combination of profane terms—a “Bitch cunt” (153). It is
abundantly clear from the first moments of this sequence that embodying a female form
was intended to be degrading, to strip any masculinity and agency from Kovacs. His
torture begins henceforth, and although he is in a virtual space, Kovacs notes that this
makes it possible to “torture a human being to death, and then start again,” making it
even more intense than corporeal forms of torture (156). As he describes his violent
sexual assault, he notes that there is “no kind of conditioning in the known universe” that
could have prepared him for that experience (156). He dissociates, with stream of
consciousness narration taking over in the following pages. The only way to maintain his
sanity inside a female body is to do all he can to get out of it. When he is finally released,
the normally circumspect Kovacs abandons all restraint and slaughters every single
person working in the facility. He reiterates throughout the narrative that what they did to
him was “personal,” not just ordinary violence that comes with their line of work.
Kovacs, a man not shaken by much, is deeply affected by this vulnerable experience.
This is an enactment of the rape-revenge fantasy, which Wendy Hesford writes “provides
an example of how women negotiate, resist, or reproduce rape scripts with their bodies,
actions, and narratives” (193). Kovacs most definitely harbors a desire for revenge and
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acts upon it, even killing those who work in the body-smuggling ring but are otherwise
unrelated to Kovacs’s rape.
What is notable here is that Kovacs experiences gendered violence against his
female body, but is only capable of enacting his revenge fantasy in a male body. John
Schwetman writes that Morgan “engages with feminism and multiculturalism in creative
and productive ways for the most part” (137). I must disclose that I haven’t read the two
novels that follow Altered Carbon, but in terms of this novel, I disagree. Morgan suggests
that, indeed, our bodies affect our subjectivity. They’re significant to the way we
experience the world and the way the world perceives us. Using those notions, Morgan
suggests that the bodies of females, an expansive and diverse categorization, are
inherently and specifically different to the bodies of males. This difference is founded
upon sexed body parts and the view of the woman as deeply determined by her flesh.
From a posthumanist perspective, Morgan’s emphasis on the differences between the
male and female parallel the differences between the human and the non-human; those
differences are real, but they carry less significance than we attribute to them. Morgan
reproduces a world in which rape is used as a tool to degrade and disempower female
bodies. And the revenge fantasy, a plot device used as a reversal of this trauma, cannot be
enacted in the violated female body. The gender essentialism employed in this section is
incongruent with the rest of the text, so I find it hard to argue that this plotline is
intentionally feminist. The implications are troubling: that the remnants of humanism and
Cartesian dualism are so imperceptible in discourses about sex and gender that they slip
into a text that is otherwise critical of those concepts.
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Ultimately, Morgan illustrates the various benefits of the disembodiment of
consciousness as conceptualized by Bostrom but also demonstrates that those benefits
could come with a range of problematic caveats. Immortality is possible, yes, but
conditional. The extremely wealthy are the only population who can truly supersede
death through automatic back-ups of their consciousness and clones of their bodies, while
lower-class cortical stacks sit dormant in storage. Consciousness can be condensed into
information and sent across galaxies in minutes, but at the cost of alienating inextricable
components of the body, which is shown to be distressing enough for the average person
to opt out of resleeving. Those who choose (or must) inhabit a revolving door of bodies
must develop an austere, dissociated attitude to cope with the trauma of being constantly
resleeved. Kovacs says, “It took a certain kind of person to keep going, to want to keep
going, life after life, sleeve after sleeve. You had to start out different, never mind what
you might become as the centuries piled up” (71). The Meths, like Kawahara and
Miriam, view the lives of others as insignificant in comparison to their own extended
lifespans. Morgan seems to argue that the physical separation of the mind and the body is
possible, but not without drastic consequences. The toll of splitting two facets of a person
that are equally important in the construction of the self can be far too difficult to bear.
II. “Rent, Don’t Sell”
Like Altered Carbon, Calvin Gimpelevich’s short story “Rent, Don’t Sell”
addresses the importance of embodiment in a body-swapping culture. However, the lack
of an immortal cortical stack means that the individuals in this story maintain a sense of
ownership over their bodies. Nok, the protagonist of this story, is the exception to this
rule, as she desperately wants a different body. She is a Marine veteran who lost an arm
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in combat but was deemed healthy enough to be ineligible for a new body. Instead, Nok
makes a living swapping into the bodies of the wealthy to exercise on their behalf, which
offers a brief reprieve from her own body. Nok’s coworker, Natasha, reveals that she is a
transgender woman who agreed to swap bodies with a transgender man to alleviate her
gender dysphoria. However, she regrets her decision and is fighting to obtain legal
ownership of her former body. Nok witnessing the exploitation of her sister’s body and
Natasha’s distress inside of a foreign body serves to shift Nok’s view of the effect of
embodiment on the mind and reinforces the notion that the body carries information that
influences and constructs the consciousness.
Gimpelevich presents body-swapping as a particularly damaging facet of
consumerism in this narrative, with multiple examples of exploitative jobs that involve
body-swapping. The least problematic of these is likely Nok’s job. She is paid to
temporarily inhabit other bodies and exercise inside of them, leaving the owner of this
body with all the benefits of exercise without requiring effort or initiative. Although
Nok’s motivation is being commodified, she is also using the bodies of her clients as an
opportunity to experience life with two arms again: “She hated the clients. She hated
herself. They took what they had for granted” (85). In this sense, the relationship between
Nok and her clients is both mutually exploitative and mutually beneficial. Although the
clients possess the power in this dichotomy, Nok is being compensated monetarily and
with the fleeting experience of what she so desperately wants: an abled body.
This position isn’t the first body-swapping employment Nok has had, however.
Her friend Joe referred her to a different body-swapping job: embodying a detoxing
addict for six weeks. It pays $3000 a client, which comes out to $500 a week for a job
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that has no time clock. Nok did this once, but never again, deciding that it’s “not worth
it” (84). Even at her new job, Nok was accidentally swapped into a detoxing alcoholic,
and she says, “Like, if my mother was there, and she had a drink, I would’ve punched her
in the face to get it” (96). The physical sensations and reactions that go on inside the body
don’t leave that body when a consciousness does, but they certainly have massive effects
on whatever consciousness is in there. Her friend Joe, for instance, succumbed to the
pressure and, presumably, the addictions of his clients. He was fired after being found
falling asleep with “track marks fresh up one leg” (84). This is the first allusion to the
idea that the body has its own memories and history that constructs consciousness. Joe, a
man with no history of drug use, fell into addiction, presumably as a result of
experiencing the cravings synonymous with detoxing.
The body-swapping work that ultimately leads Nok to reject her desire for a new
body is that of her sister Mara, whose body is rented to strangers for purposes that she
isn’t legally allowed to know. Mara assures Nok that she doesn’t want to know what the
clients do with her body anyway. She says, “Does it matter? I mean, I’m not there. It’s a
shell. It’s not like your body remembers” (89). This seems to play on the rhetoric that
refers to sex workers as selling their bodies, but this text takes the idea literally. As the
title suggests, though, Mara rents her body, she doesn’t sell it. Mara’s devaluation of her
materiality as a “shell” shows how the ubiquity of body swapping makes it easy to
privilege the mind over the body. After all, the reality is that Mara has no conscious idea
what her body does when she rents it away. However, after 3 months, Nok observes
physical changes in her sister, noting that there were “other traits in her face, evidence of
other habits, a sharpness, experience, different knits to her brow” (94). Mara’s body
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betrays evidence of experience, despite Mara not having been present for those
experiences. Nok draws a striking contrast between her employment and Mara’s: Nok
leaves noticeable effects on the bodies of her clients while Mara’s clients leave noticeable
effects on Mara’s body (95). This realization heightens Nok’s concern for the well-being
of her sister.
What ultimately makes Nok disgusted with the commodification of bodies (and
her own use of them) is recognizing similarities between herself and one of Mara’s
clients. Nok watches Mara’s body be inspected and bought by a client, who refers to her
as it: “I’ll take it”; “I need it now” (98). Mara and Nok had plans, but Mara either can’t or
won’t refuse the woman’s request. In that moment, Nok recognizes a similarity between
herself and this client: “They were the same … She rented bodies. She used them to
remember life with two hands” (98). Nok uses the experience of her employment to
explain to Mara that bodies do, in fact, retain and remember what has been done to them.
But watching the client, described as a “crone” (98), use Mara’s body to chase the youth
she once had makes Nok realize that her reasons for working as a body-swapper come
from a similar place. Just before the scene in question, Nok finishes her day at work by
doing pull-ups, an exercise she is unable to do with one arm. “It was a work pleasure,”
Nok says (96). Nok derives contentment from her work by using other bodies to escape
the realities of her own, a motivation that mimics the crone’s use of Mara’s body. The
difference is money: Nok can only temporarily escape her unwanted body through labor
while the crone can use her money to escape an unwanted body and do anything she likes
in the new one.
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Nok does, however, meet and begin dating a woman who was able to attain a new
body without spending money, but she deeply regrets her decision to do so. Natasha, a
transgender woman, met a transgender man in a chat room and agreed to switch their
bodies. On the surface, a transgender woman and a transgender man agreeing to swap
bodies seems like a mutually beneficial, affirming option. It’s a painless, fast, and
affordable way to transition, particularly in comparison to hormones and surgeries.
However, Nok observes that Natasha looks physically uncomfortable in her body, noting,
“She moved like a stranger to her own skin” (86). Natasha later confirms this
observation, saying that her new hormones make her feel like herself but when she looks
at herself in the mirror, “it’s someone else’s reflection” (91). Swapping bodies alleviated
Natasha’s gender dysphoria but replaced it with an existential, embodiment dysphoria, a
disturbing prospect to say the least.
Through the depiction of Natasha’s discomfort in her new body, Gimpelevich
offers a critique of the “wrong body” narrative that is commonly used to explain what it
means to be transgender (e.g., She feels like she was born in the wrong (male) body).
Ulrica Engdahl writes that this has been criticized by various academic and social
movements for “producing a reified image of both body and self as static and separate
entities and thereby correlating an essentialism of genital materiality that disputes the
realness of transgender experience” (267). The wrong body narrative is, at its core, a
reinforcement of mind-body dualism, a notion that Engdahl argues erases the wide range
of subjectively constructed bodily meanings among trans people while reinforcing a
gender binary in which not-male equals female. Natasha, who receives what is supposed
to be the perfect solution to her “wrong body,” only feels like her body is wrong once she
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inhabits a cisgender female body. She explains that she made the switch because she
thought she was too tall to pass4, but now says, “I don’t even care if I pass. It used to
hang over my head—the most important part of transition, you know? Be a woman, look
like a woman” (92). Natasha’s rejection of the expectation to pass seems to stem from a
reinterpretation of her priorities: she swapped bodies to feel comfortable in her own
embodiment, a desire she wholly attributed to gender dysphoria and her ability to pass.
She discovers, though, that sacrificing all other elements of her body to attain a cis
female one only heightened her discomfort.
The man inhabiting Natasha’s former body doesn’t reciprocate her feelings of
distress and refuses to switch back, a decision affirmed by the court after Natasha sues
him. She has no legal basis on which to reclaim her former body because in this society,
“Property contracts were binding—bodies belonged to the mind” (96). Again, the
dominant culture assumes that because what is considered the mind and body can be
separated, that the mind is an entity that is capable of ownership and the body is a
commodity. However, the instances of body swapping seen throughout the text indicate
that the relationship between the mind and body is far more intertwined and complex than
these simple dichotomies. The distress that Natasha feels in her new body makes this
abundantly clear. She says, “This skin is driving me crazy. It makes me feel things that
aren’t mine—I swear, his memories live in this body. I feel it in his stomach. The body
wants to turn me into him. To make us a fusion” (96). Her subjectivity is so detached
from her physical embodiment that she refers to the body she’s in as his, not her own.
To “pass,” in this context, refers to when a transgender person is perceived as the gender they identify as.
The desire to assimilate into a cisgender, binary conception of gender isn’t shared among all trans people,
and the term itself is contentious due to the implication that trans people are deceitful by presenting as they
wish to.
4
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The notion that the body itself carries information and memories is reiterated time and
time again, from the transferal of addiction from the body to the mind to Mara’s body
holding the remnants of experiences that she can never consciously know of.
The notion that the mind cannot own the body because the body constructs the
mind is what fuels Nok and Natasha’s decision to reclaim Natasha’s original body by
force. Nok says that her military experience taught her “If you can take it, it’s yours. It’s
what countries do, what rich people do, what politicians and muggers and bastards all
do—it’s yours” (99). In a society in which desirable bodies can be rented for personal
use, in which the working class is paid to do the dirty work of the wealthy while wearing
their skin, in which a mind simply has to claim a body to own it, in which a body can be
bought, sold, and traded like a used vehicle, then it also follows that the body can be
subject to robbery or reclamation. The closing lines are Nok’s fond memory of “the body
abandoned. When the Irish skin crumpled and the stranger filled with her girl” (101). The
body that was previously unfamiliar to Nok becomes strikingly familiar once Natasha is
within it. Natasha is more authentically herself inside of her original body than she was in
her swapped female body, even before pursuing traditional transition in order to achieve
what she once wanted more than anything: to pass. Instead of body swapping, Natasha
seeks transition in a process that is true to the word “transition.” While taking hormones,
her body changes in a process that is under her control and contingent upon her comfort.
Through the depiction of Natasha’s regret, the exploitation of Mara’s body, and
the ways in which bodily processes like substance withdrawals have profound effects on
the mind, Gimpelevich posits that the body and mind can be separated, but not cleanly.
The conditions of embodiment are deeply impactful, and the body can retain memories
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and evidence of experience that construct the function of the mind. The last lines of the
story mention that “Nok’s arm stopped hurting” (101). Even though her success in
obtaining Natasha’s former body proves that she has the capability to run away in a new
body, she opts not to. Nok internalizes that although the body can fail to reflect the selfconception constructed by the mind, there is no such thing as a wrong body.
III. “The Girl Who Was Plugged In”
James Tiptree’s short story “The Girl Who Was Plugged In” (1973) is unlike the
other two texts in this chapter in that it offers no evidence of the future technology being
used in beneficial ways. A societal reject on the basis of her ugly appearance, a teenage
girl named P. Burke attempts suicide and is resuscitated by GTX, a corporation that
promises to make her one of “the gods,” a group of impossibly beautiful and influential
people who, unbeknownst to consumers, are created by companies in order to promote
their products without violating an advertising ban. P. Burke is the brain controlling
Delphi, a genetically engineered, organic body without any autonomous thought or
agency. Through her embodiment as Delphi, P. Burke falls in love with the son of a GTX
executive named Paul, who is under the impression that Delphi is an ordinary person who
has been implanted with surveillance and control devices. In his attempt to be a knight in
shining armor, demanding her implants be removed, he shoves and accidentally kills P.
Burke, thus killing Delphi as well.
The story is, at its core, a subversion of reader expectations. We are primed for a
rags-to-riches story along the lines of Cinderella and Pygmalion, but Tiptree delivers
something far drearier and more pessimistic. The law intended to stop the scourge of
consumerism only makes it more potent, Delphi/P. Burke’s criticism of the faulty
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products that she is promoting does nothing to halt the corrupt trajectory of GTX, and P.
Burke’s attempt to live a life in which her love is reciprocated is rendered impossible.
Tiptree also offers an abrasive narrator that addresses “you,” a listener, who implicates
both readers and writers in the romanticization of a future that, without substantial
societal change, will intensify the various inequalities that plague the present. But like the
other texts here, Tiptree asserts that the relationship between the mind and body is not a
dichotomy, as Delphi exhibits the echoes of P. Burke’s consciousness even when P.
Burke isn’t plugged in.
The body-swap in this story isn’t strictly a swap, as P. Burke embodies both
herself and Delphi simultaneously. P. Burke is recruited from a hospital following a
suicide attempt, which was motivated by her inability to find acceptance in a materialistic
society. For all intents and purposes, P. Burke is rendered legally dead after she departs
from the hospital. She lives her “afterlife” as Delphi, a “perfect girl body” who exists to
draw positive attention and adoration, an experience P. Burke has never experienced
(Tiptree 10). When P. Burke is first learning to maneuver Delphi’s body, it is established
that P. Burke’s experience isn’t that of an outside observer to the body she controls; her
subjectivity is shifted from her own body to Delphi’s. She is connected to Delphi using
electrodes that were surgically implanted into her brain, which makes her capable of
controlling the distant body in the same way that an ordinary person’s brain controls
theirs. As the narrator describes it, “When you wash your hands, do you feel the water is
running on your brain? Of course not. You feel the water on your hand, although the
‘feeling’ is actually a potential-pattern flickering over the electrochemical jelly between
your ears” (10). The process of moving P. Burke’s mind to Delphi’s body differs from
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the methods seen in Altered Carbon and “Rent, Don’t Sell” in that her entire
consciousness isn’t transferred from her body to Delphi’s. Instead, P. Burke’s brain
activity is broadcast to Delphi’s body, making her a “real live girl with her brain in an
unusual place” (18). P. Burke is essentially embodied in two bodies at once. She is
gaining lived experience through Delphi, but that lived experience is perceived and made
into meaning by P. Burke’s brain, thousands of miles away.
P. Burke’s subjective experience as embodied in Delphi suggests that
embodiment is extremely important to Tiptree. P. Burke revels in the attention and social
life she attains as a beautiful person but her lack of deep physical sensation in Delphi’s
body is quite troubling to her, particularly when she falls in love with Paul. Delphi’s body
offers P. Burke no taste or smell, and the touch she does have (i.e., running water) is
dulled: “Fabrics that would prickle P. Burke’s own hide feel like a cool plastic film to
Delphi” (20). The corporation simply is not motivated, in terms of capital, to incorporate
those senses in their genetically modified bodies. For P. Burke, the initial bliss of being
desired and loved outweighs this loss of sensory information. After all, she has lived her
whole life with senses, but has never experienced the positive attention that she does as
Delphi. But when Delphi begins dating Paul, P. Burke is described as “Trying over
twenty-double-thousand miles of hard vacuum to reach her beloved through girl-flesh
numbed by an invisible film … Trying to taste and smell him through beautiful dead
nostrils, to love him back with a body that goes dead in the heart of the fire” (37). P.
Burke is unable to express her love in a wholehearted—or rather, wholebodied—way due
to the limitations posed both by the design of the body she inhabits and the sheer fact that
her brain, the organ that processes sensory experiences and creates meaning from them, is
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thousands of miles from the body experiencing love. The idea of transplanting the
functions of the mind into another body, in this world, has stark limitations, which
reinforces the idea that the mind and body do not exist in a dichotomy.
Despite the limitations of this codependency and double embodiment, it leads to
an unexpected phenomenon: Delphi’s uninhabited body displays autonomous behaviors
that seem to mimic the sentiments of P. Burke. In order to keep P. Burke alive, she is
periodically unplugged from Delphi’s body to eat, move, and rest. When P. Burke’s brain
isn’t present, Delphi enters a deathlike sleep. But after P. Burke controls her for a few
weeks, Delphi begins to make small movements by herself, and once, “she breathed a
sound: ‘Yes’” (27). The narrator remarks that the employees monitoring Delphi’s speech
and hearing weren’t paying enough attention to recognize this alarming development.
Later, Paul tells Delphi that she “called his name in her sleep” (43). It seems that, unlike
the expected sci fi experiment-gone-wrong, Delphi isn’t developing an independent
consciousness. Like muscle memory, Delphi’s body is enacting P. Burke’s most
dominating thoughts. P. Burke hopes that she will “die and be born again in Delphi,” a
notion that the narrator brushes off as “garbage” (46). But when P. Burke does die,
Delphi remains alive for hours, although she is merely a ghost of what she once was. She
recognizes Paul and says his name repeatedly, along with “I’m Delphi” and “don’t sleep”
(55). Paul was a name that Delphi said without P. Burke previously, but introducing
herself may be an allusion to P. Burke’s desire to be born again in Delphi. The optimistic
reader could interpret this as P. Burke actually experiencing her final moments as Delphi,
unconnected to her own body and in bliss. The pessimistic reader could say that this is
just another echo, just like the words she said in her sleep throughout the story. In any
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case, it’s abundantly clear that the body remembers the shape of P. Burke’s mind, even to
a small extent.
Although P. Burke and Delphi are intrinsically connected, GTX ultimately reuses
Delphi’s body with a new brain controlling her, the final example of this corporation
viewing P. Burke as nothing more than an easily manipulated commodity. P. Burke is
shown to be tragically naïve throughout the course of the text. Even when she is recruited
from the hospital, her choices are to be arrested for attempted suicide (which is illegal in
this setting) or to work for GTX. Although she unequivocally wants the opportunity to
mingle with “the gods,” she really wouldn’t have much of a choice no matter how she
felt. Mr. Cantle, a GTX chairman, briefly describes the expectations they have for Delphi.
When he explains that she is promoting products as a way to covertly advertise, she
expresses discomfort at the idea of potentially breaking laws. Mr. Cantle tells Delphi that
she is performing a public service by promoting quality products, and she earnestly
believes him. When Delphi enthusiastically agrees to the conditions of her position, the
narrator mentions that Mr. Cantle has a second speech prepared for when subjects are
more wary of the deal, “But he can sense only eagerness here. Good. He doesn’t really
enjoy the other speech” (17). Later, the narrator describes how it’s a good business
investment to have some controllable gods because they will obey the wishes of GTX for
reasons he doesn’t mention, as “Mr. Cantle never finished his speech” (23). If this isn’t
ominous enough, when Delphi proves to be unacceptably disobedient, the technicians
who monitor and maintain the connection of P. Burke’s brain to Delphi’s body reveal that
they are capable of inflicting pain and severing the connection as needed. P. Burke,
blinded by the opportunity to abandon her miserable life in exchange for affection, is
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unaware that nobody in GTX values her as a person. Instead, she is a commodity. An
experiment. A voodoo doll.
The narrator of this story, known only as “the sharp faced man,” is able to tell this
story because he was one of the technicians who subjected P. Burke and Delphi to
torture, which he took great joy in. When he is discouraged from inflicting extreme pain
on Delphi because it could kill her, he responds with vitriol: “The sharp-faced lad is
angry. ‘Pull that pig out of the controls!’” (48). While Joe, the head of the cybernetics
team, is concerned about the preservation of a system he worked so hard to perfect and
Mr. Cantle is concerned about “the investment,” the sharp-faced lad seems to strictly be
motivated by sadism and entertainment (49). The narrator is overbearingly critical of P.
Burke’s appearance throughout his storytelling, referring to her as “the ugly of the world”
(3), “a pumped-out hulk” (5), a “grim carcass” (20), and “a gaunt she-golem” (53). This
pattern, I think, emerges from three places. One is that the narrator is shown to be overly
cruel. Another is that the only role we see the sharp-faced man fill in the story is as P.
Burke’s punisher. Perhaps the remnants of his work have carried into his language.
Lastly, his sadism is certainly a reflection of the general society from which he came. If
beauty makes one a “god,” it only follows that a lack of beauty makes one a monster.
These derogatory nicknames allude to the role of the narrator: to draw attention to
the skewed focus of the average sci fi reader and writer. Schwetman, in reference to
contemporary sci fi, writes, “Much science fiction simply celebrates the advance of
civilization and the march of technological progress across the universe … such works
tend to remain in a starry-eyed mode of pure appreciation of the advantages” (132).
Although there is no mistaking the corrupt underbelly of the future in Tiptree’s story, the
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setting does have an enticing veneer, which the narrator describes in multiple diversions.
He says, “But you’re curious about the city? So ordinary after all, in the FUTURE? Ah,
there’s plenty to swing with here—and it’s not all that far in the future, dad. But pass up
the sci-fi stuff for now…” (3). Despite asking the listener to resist their interest in the
details of the future, the narrator goes on to list examples of the novel technology that
we’re supposedly not paying attention to before reminding the listener, “We’re watching
that girl” (3). While the narrator distracts the reader with these intriguing details about the
future, P. Burke is in the process of attempting suicide, a significant moment to miss in
the protagonist’s story. Melissa Colleen Stevenson writes that, in this moment, “The
listener and, through him, the reader are implicated in this lack of focus” (96). However,
it’s worth noting that this narrative isn’t a dialogue between the narrator and the listener.
The narrator isn’t responding to the requests of the listener, although he is making
assumptions about what the reader wants to hear. Ultimately, the narrator is the arbiter of
how the story is told and chooses what the reader will focus on.
The storyteller is who sets the precedent for what a reader expects from a work of
genre fiction. If, to reiterate Stevenson’s assertion, the listener is representative of the
reader, I think that the narrator is representative of a sci fi author. The long history of sci
fi offering a “starry-eyed” celebration of a technological future and a trivial, often easily
resolved conflict within that future has encouraged sci fi readers to disengage with the
story and characters within it in favor of flashy technology. After all, sci fi has developed
a notorious reputation for sacrificing an intriguing plot in favor of an intriguing premise
or setting. Tiptree’s narrator says as much when Delphi and Paul first meet and fall in
love. The narrator briefly describes the inner lives of both individuals before cutting
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himself off, saying, “Really you can skip all this, when the loving little girl on the
yellow-brick road meets a Man” (37). The narrator reduces the budding romance between
the couple to a trope so that he can expedite his way into more action.
Like Tiptree’s critique of the market-driven desire for flash characterization in sci
fi, this story is eerily prescient in terms of critiquing and predicting the future of
advertising, as corporations have gained increasing accessibility to our personal
information and are capable of manipulating marketing strategies in response to this data.
In Tiptree’s dystopic future, advanced technology is exploited by GTX to promote their
products. The use of product placement arises out of necessity: companies are no longer
allowed to explicitly advertise, limiting their marketing options to “displays in or on the
product itself, visible during its legitimate use or in on-premise sales” (13). Although the
notion of products being displayed and promoted in their true form seems more authentic
than the use of traditional advertising methods (I am reminded of the mascara
commercials that feature the tiny disclaimer that, to simulate the results of the product,
the model’s eyes were enhanced with lash inserts), companies have found ways to
effectively promote subpar products regardless. Of course, this is where the production of
“the gods” comes from, the creation of bodies that are genetically engineered to be
beautiful and, thus, influential. As Mr. Cantle tells Delphi before she makes her public
debut, “You saw Ananga [one of the gods] using one so you thought it must be good, eh?
And it is good or a great human being like Ananga wouldn’t be using it” (14). The
tenuous (and frankly, baseless) link between beauty, morality, and trustworthiness makes
the gods a potent influential force. The narrator describes an “automatic inbuilt viewer
feedback” system in televisions, which tracks the reactions and moods of viewers in real

110
time so that content can be adjusted accordingly. This subtle tracking is prescient of
contemporary companies buying the personal information of social media users to
distribute targeted advertising. GTX’s use of beloved media figures to promote products
parallels corporate use of social media celebrities—who are often referred to as
“influencers”—to promote products in their content. In this story, published in the early
1970s, Tiptree expressed anxiety about what advertising would soon become. This
anxiety appears to have been justified.
While Morgan’s novel and Gimpelevich’s story offer a troubling speculation
about the commercialization of the body, the body in Tiptree’s story functions more like
a puppet. The deception of Delphi’s glossy and beautiful appearance is not that her
identity is truly constructed by a “grim carcass” that exists beyond—and within—her
(20). The deception is that her sole purpose for existing at all is to serve as a living
billboard or pop-up advertisement. P. Burke’s ineffable fusion with Delphi’s body was
merely an unexpected inconvenience to GTX, which was swiftly resolved once they
found a new person to fill the vacancy left in Delphi’s mind. While placing a price on
bodies and assigning ownership to minds is problematic, the body in Altered Carbon and
“Rent, Don’t Sell” is at least acknowledged as having intrinsic value and some degree of
autonomy once it is inhabited. On the other hand, the only value of the posthuman body
in this story is determined by how much profit it can accrue for GTX.
IV. Conclusion
Each of these narratives depict futures in which the mind and body can be
physically separated, as conceptualized by Descartes and Bostrom alike, but stipulate that
fundamentally changing one’s embodiment is not inconsequential. In Altered Carbon and
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“Rent, Don’t Sell” body swapping can be deeply traumatic and cost prohibitive, which
reinforces class disparities. In “The Girl That Was Plugged In,” it is used to manipulate a
vulnerable teenager into enforcing the beauty standards that made her so loathed in the
first place. Minds are also shown to be deeply influenced, or even created, by their
embodiment. The characters in Altered Carbon often express intense discomfort upon
being resleeved, and those who are resleeved indefinitely tend to become jaded and
insensitive. The body affects the mind in a number of ways in “Rent, Don’t Sell,” from
the addictions of a body reproducing itself in a foreign mind to the overwhelming
discomfort Natasha feels after ceding her original body to someone else. In “The Girl
That Was Plugged In,” P. Burke and Delphi become so intertwined that Delphi’s body
echoes the dynamic of P. Burke’s mind even when P. Burke is not physically connected
to her. These authors certainly do not suggest that the mind can live on, preserved and
pristine, outside of the body that constructed it. Instead, as Hayles suggests, the
informational patterns in the brain can be uploaded elsewhere, but the way those patterns
would adapt to their new embodiment doesn’t guarantee that the relocated consciousness
will present or perceive its environment identically to its function within its original
body. Hayles writes that within discussions of cybernetics and posthuman futures,
“embodiment continues to be discussed as if it were a supplement to be purged from the
dominant term of information, an accident of evolution we are now in a position to
correct” (12). Despite toying with the permanence of embodiment, these narratives reject
the optimism at the heart of transhumanism by simply positing that the mechanics of reembodiment are far more complex and beyond our understanding than is suggested by
the imagery of uploading a brain to a computer. Transcending bodily limitations,
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including the hierarchies imposed upon those bodies, is unlikely to be as straightforward
as inventing and using the appropriate technology to do so. It’s uncertain if a complete
shift in embodiment would render the consciousness recognizable. I wouldn’t say that
these authors are wholly rejecting the implementation of body-swapping. However, they
are certainly asking for the reader to consider who encourages its use and for what
reasons.
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Conclusion
It’s abundantly clear that posthuman technologies in science fiction are dominated
by dystopian representation. The incredible achievement of creating artificial, intelligent
life in Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is solely used to make slaves, and
Lai’s “Rachel” describes how the integration of sex and race in these creations is used to
reinforce oppressive stereotypes and render objectification literal. The cyborgian
technological components seen in Older’s “The Black Box,” McDonnell’s “Lingua
Franca,” and Saunders’s “Jon” are depicted as unreliable, invasive, and weaponized to
strengthen the exploitative effects of colonialism and late-stage capitalism. The ability to
separate the consciousness from the body in Morgan’s Altered Carbon, Gimpelevich’s
“Rent, Don’t Sell,” and Tiptree’s “The Girl Who Was Plugged In” may be a fatally
flawed project, as it works under the assumption that the mind is strictly disembodied
information that is independent from the material it exists in.
As I have argued, the hierarchies that have been justified by humanist philosophy
are the source of the dystopias that are imagined by these authors, not the presence of
posthuman technology. If these stories are taken to be cautionary tales against scientific
advancement, then they effectively pose no possibility of optimism in our current time, as
there is no indication that technological innovation will halt any time soon. Technology is
also a broad and amoral force to rail against. Although the term is associated with
electronic devices, the written word, a prosthesis that allows me to communicate with
you across space and time, is so ingrained in our culture that we don’t even conceive of it
as a technological tool. David Wiley writes that in terms of technology, “the locus of
good and ill moves from the tools back to the agents who suggest, teach, and train each
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other the ‘proper’ ways to use them” (38). The effects of the written word, like any other
technology, are contingent on the intentions of the creator and the user.
In the eight narratives I have analyzed, humanist ideology and Cartesian dualism
distort posthuman technology into a harmful force. Humanism is aspirational, but it has
never served all people or the environment that is indispensable to human existence. The
hierarchizing of the human over all other beings was established and reinforced by those
who have determined that some of us are more human than others. As Rosi Braidotti
writes, the humanist Man is “implicitly assumed to be masculine, white, urbanized,
speaking a standard language, heterosexually inscribed in a reproductive unit, and a full
citizen of a recognized polity” (23). Under this assumption, humanism is inadequate in
producing equity. The minds who forged American democracy and declared that all men
are created equal, as inspired by philosophers like John Locke and David Hume, didn’t
categorize women, slaves, and those who didn’t own property as “men.” Likewise, the
European declarations of the rights of men didn’t extend to the groups of people that
were subjected to colonial rule.
Although the contents of science fiction do not dictate laws and colonies, it is
worth noting that the humanist Man as defined by Braidotti can be found in abundance in
this genre. Finding protagonists and authors with diverse identities and experiences is
certainly easier now than it has been in the past. Still, Denise Morales Soto writes that
although women and racial minorities comprise a sizeable percentage of science fiction
readers, publishers appear to be committed to a myth of the normative white, male
science fiction reader. Morales Soto writes, “Science fiction and fantasy so naturally
lends itself to inclusion and yet we continue to fight against it” (14). Science fiction’s
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fascination with the Other is quite harmonious with the real experiences of various
groups that just aren’t commonly represented in mainstream science fiction. For instance,
Calvin Gimpelevich’s “Rent, Don’t Sell” appears in the anthology Meanwhile,
Elsewhere, which is composed entirely of fiction by transgender sci fi and fantasy
writers. Gender nonconformity has a long precedent of appearing in media for the
purposes of comedy and horror. There are few depictions of respectfully presented
transgender characters in science fiction, and the narratives that do are often relegated to
outright transgender sci fi anthologies like Meanwhile, Elsewhere. Both Larissa Lai’s
“Rachel” and Carole McDonnell’s “Lingua Franca” were published in the postcolonial
science fiction anthology So Long Been Dreaming. Nalo Hopkinson, an editor of the
anthology, writes that the contributors take the trope of colonizing foreign lands and
“critique it, pervert it, fuck with it, with irony, with anger, with humor, and also, with
love and respect for the genre of science fiction that makes it possible to think about new
ways of doing things” (18). Colonization is an age-old plot in science fiction texts. Why
isn’t postcolonial subjectivity found in abundance in the genre’s largest publishing
houses? Why are science fiction protagonists so often independent agents of change that
largely goes unexplored? I chose to explore diverse posthumanist texts because they each
offer distinctive insights into how future technology could be wielded against
disempowered and marginalized groups.
The persistent liberal humanist belief in autonomy and human exceptionalism
wasn’t equipped to address the systems and hegemonies that deeply impact choice and
freedom. It wasn’t founded in light of the scientific consensus that the human is subjected
to the same forces of evolution as all other living creatures. Humanism wasn’t developed
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in anticipation of the industrialization and greed that have generated the existential threat
of climate change. And in recent times, the perception of the self as independent from its
environment has been shown to be incompatible with the collective action required to
respond to a pandemic. Posthumanism, as its name implies, it the logical progression
from humanism to a philosophy that was developed in light of the altered landscape of
our world. Voices that would have once been suppressed are now contributing to a
broader and more comprehensive perspective of how the humanist doctrines of freedom
are anything but universal. It is becoming increasingly clear that no mind is disembodied
and no body is unaffected by its environment.
In his book Pale Blue Dot, astronomer and science communicator Carl Sagan
reflects on the humility that has been thrust upon the human race in light of increasing
knowledge about our planet’s role in the universe:
Think of the rivers of blood spilled by all those generals and emperors so that, in
glory and triumph, they could become the momentary masters of a fraction of a
dot. Think of the endless cruelties visited by the inhabitants of one corner of this
pixel on the scarcely distinguishable inhabitants of some other corner, how
frequent their misunderstandings, how eager they are to kill one another, how
fervent their hatreds. Our posturings, our imagined self-importance, the delusion
that we have some privileged position in the Universe, are challenged by this
point of pale light … In our obscurity, in all this vastness, there is no hint that
help will come from elsewhere to save us from ourselves. (13)
The framing through which we view our own subjectivity is inadequate in light of the
understanding that the observable universe is unfathomably large, and we are
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unfathomably miniscule. But paradoxically, we are also vital participants in a dominoeffect of feedback loops. We are affecting and being affected by things technological and
organic, human and nonhuman. The state of artificial embodiment, technologically
integrated embodiment, and swapped embodiment as explored in these works of science
fiction are shown to drastically affect the way a subject perceives itself and interacts with
its surroundings. If we begin to critically examine our relationship with the environment
that surrounds and encapsulates our bodies, perhaps we can contribute to a domino-effect
that makes our pale blue dot more habitable and equitable for all of its inhabitants, even
in the face of an unknowable future.
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